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Globalization and the hegemony of  neoliberalism has created a situation in 
which cities compete with other cities for business, wealthy residents, and tourism. 
This global urban competition spans national borders, and has exacerbated levels 
of  inequality. Cities often employ strategies of  architectural production, typi-
cally monumental, highly symbolic urban design projects to create a city image 
and brand that is attractive to global capital. Medellin, Colombia focused instead 
on building small scale, yet iconic, urban design projects in marginalized com-
munities, primarily to reduce poverty, crime, and inequality under Mayor Sergio 
Fajardo (2004-2007). These projects, known as Integral Urban Projects (Proyectos 
Urbanos Integrales, or PUI), have raised the international profile of  Medellin as a 
city reinventing its image using innovative strategies to raise the quality of  living 
for its most disadvantaged citizens. Over the last ten years, however, the city’s 
priorities have begun to shift as it receives more international media attention and 
recognition. Does Medellin’s ability to leverage small-scale, peripheral strategy 
of  architectural production represent a more egalitarian approach to attracting 
capital, inviting tourism, and generating influence, or do the pressures of  global 
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The desire for legitimacy and global competitiveness has become a top 
priority for major cities around the world as they seek status as a ‘global city.’ The 
term appears in promotional literature for a wide variety of  projects and initiatives 
in cities in both the Global North and South. Political and economic developments 
over the last few decades have increased pressure on cities to compete not only 
regionally and nationally, but globally. Cities often construct a narrative of  com-
petitiveness to demonstrate their superior and growing ability to attract capital 
and tourism. Monumental urban projects have become a way for cities to project 
images of  prosperity and power, and the image of  global city ambitions have 
become familiar: dazzling skylines with signature urban projects, pristine and 
bustling airports, and most recently, wildly ambitious mega-projects like eco-cities 
and high-tech corridors. The construction of  these identities, images, and narra-
tives is a necessary part of  city branding.
Beneath the symbolism, global cities are also characterized by high- and 
low-level service industries, growing income polarization and marginalization 
of  large segments of  the urban population. City officials take for granted that the 
influx of  wealth and connectivity to global networks will lead to economic devel-
opment of  the whole city. However, inequality is growing in most global cities—as 
it is virtually everywhere—and the rise of  neoliberalism over the last forty years 
has withered the welfare state that once protected vulnerable populations in many 
countries. Even today’s monumental public projects often benefit only a small 
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segment of  the population. Although some mega-projects, like mass transit infra-
structure, can potentially benefit a significant portion of  the population, many 
projects simply serve an ideal type of  urban resident: wealthy, professional, high-
tech, and mobile.
Not all cities have the desire, financial resources, or political will to con-
struct monumental urban projects, however. Particularly in Latin America, some 
cities are seeking innovative, smaller-scale projects as a way to reduce crime and 
poverty in marginalized neighborhoods. This approach is sometimes called ‘urban 
acupuncture.’ A term coined by Spanish architect Manuel de Sola-Morales (1999), 
it is a new approach for urban interventions for solving some of  the city’s most 
intractable problems, including inequality. Like the term ‘global city,’ urban acu-
puncture has no single definition, but generally urban acupuncture projects are 
small-scale, neighborhood-level projects that have been strategically targeted to 
set off  a chain reaction of  benefits throughout the city. Although the idea draws 
on Chinese medicine and philosophy, the idea was first developed in Europe and 
has taken off  in Latin America where former Curitiba mayor and innovator Jaime 
Lerner (2005) has prescribed urban acupuncture as the most effective way of  
improving urban sustainability, mobility, and sociodiversity. In the context of  the 
glitz of  global city aspirations, small-scale, integral projects in the spirit of  urban 
acupuncture may provide an alternative to mega-projects in targeting a city’s most 
dire issues and underserved populations while highlighting its own innovation.
I will examine the case of  Medellín, Colombia’s second city, where a series 
of  projects ostensibly designed to bring equitable development, security, and 
pride to the city’s least developed neighborhoods has attracted the attention of  
the global media, planners, and policy makers. The narrative of  transformation 
and economic development is similar to many globally ambitious cities, except 
that the location, scale, and stated purpose of  the projects are different. Medellin’s 
small- and medium-scale approach of  Integral Urban Projects (Proyectos Urbanos 
Integral, or PUI) involves strategic physical, social, and institutional interventions 
within the most vulnerable neighborhoods to stimulate equitable development. 
The program includes highly visible projects like iconic library parks and cultural 
centers, public escalators for increased mobility in steep neighborhoods, bridges, 
pocket parks, and ecological restoration. These projects have earned Medellin titles 
like 2013 Most Innovative City of  the Year by the Wall Street Journal and Citigroup 
(Wall Street Journal 2013), the  and virtually endless media attention from around 
the world (2013, Alford 2013, Foster 2013, Kimmelman 2012, Silva 2013). Although 
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thoroughly evaluating the effectiveness of  these projects in reducing poverty, 
crime, and alienation is important and not yet complete, this thesis will focus on 
the how these projects advance Medellin’s narrative of  competitiveness and search 
for global capital, and whether this represents a more equitable and sustainable 
approach for emerging global cities. Further, it will look at the effect of  growing 





Global urban competition is a relatively recent phenomenon, the result 
of  the rise of  neoliberalism and subsequent global city “craze.” Friedmann (1986) 
and Sassen (2001) identified how globalization was restructuring the relation-
ships between cities. As cities around the world opt to integrate themselves into 
the global capitalist system, a number of  changes take place.  Global cities serve 
as circuits for the global economy in addition to articulating regional and national 
economies. The hierarchy of  cities is essentially determined by the flows of  capital 
and people among global cities and between global cities and others further down 
the global hierarchy. Not only do global cities act as economic command points, 
they also experience internal spatial and physical changes.
Global cities are not only the result of  innovations in communication and 
transportation technology, but of  the modern political and economic era, what 
Harvey (2000) calls “a new era of  capitalist development.” The 1980s saw the grow-
ing hegemony of  neoliberal policies, encouraged by the decline of  communism. 
Enforced through institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, and US and UK foreign policy, governments around the world cut welfare 
programs, privatized assets, and promised deregulation (Sassen 2010). As manu-
facturing declined in developed countries, the service sector has thrived. Low-level 
services grow to support high-level occupations, like finance and law. The social 
costs associated with these processes outpace the resources and political will of  the 
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withering welfare state. These patterns are concentrated in global cities, result-
ing in increasing economic polarization and uneven geographical development 
(Friedmann 1986, Harvey Ley 2004, Sassen 2001). 
The global city paradigm has become so popular not just in policy circles, 
but in the academy that it has effectively pushed out other ways of  examin-
ing cities in a global context (Davis 2005).  The terms “global city”, “world city”, 
and “global city-region” are often used interchangeably in spite of  the specific 
phenomena they each identify related to cities, capitalism, and globalization 
(Derudder and Witlox 2008). The terms “global-“ or “world-class city” have prolif-
erated throughout popular, policy, and political discourse to the extent that their 
meanings have become less exact than even their use in social science literature 
(Robertson and Khondker 1998).  This imprecision, however, is an important 
aspect of  globalization in itself. ‘Global city’ has become a buzz phrase used by 
urban policy makers and their more elite constituents to indicate a developmental 
ideal, whereby the city in question becomes a center for business, finance, travel, 
and luxury products. 
A number of  scholars dispute points of  the global city hypothesis. For 
example, using only U.S. cities, Timberlake et al. (2011) tested the so-called “World 
City Hypothesis”, that the more global the city, the more polarized its citizens. 
While the study found weak evidence linking globality (represented through air 
passenger travel) to income polarization, and consequently suggests the hypoth-
esis is null. However, the study did find stronger evidence linking globality to 
higher Gini coefficients. Additionally, the study found global cities have signifi-
cantly higher upper quintile incomes, which suggests the spatial polarization 
exists on a larger scale than within each individual city.
The discourse today is virtually universal across the political spectrum and 
in both the Global North and South. The situation has become what Swyngedouw 
(2004) calls un pensée unique, “a hegemonic, incontestable and virtually natural-
ized and self-evident set of  arguments and beliefs,” as “virtually every govern-
ment, at every conceivable scale of  governance, has taken measures to align its 
social and economic policy to the ‘exigencies’ and ‘requirements’ of  this new 
competitive world (dis)order and the forces of  a new ‘truly’ free-market based 
world economy,” a process that began in first in developed countries in the 1970s 
and 80s and had spread throughout virtually the entire world by the turn of  the 
millennium. The weak attempts at resistance have typically been tied deeply to 
geography and reclamation of  territorial identity (Swyngedouw 2004). Whether or 
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not they fit any of  the specific definitions of  “global city,” nearly all cities aspire to 
that ideal. 
The global cities literature tends to take an understandably macro perspec-
tive on cities, eschewing topography and everyday life (Ley 2004). Yet the frictions 
caused by globalization on the local level are evident in what Logan and Molotch 
(2007) call “the growth machine,” whereby economic growth becomes the princi-
pal measure of  success. Accumulation of  capital becomes the driving force in the 
physical and social construction of  cities. The privileging of  exchange value leads 
to the creation of  place entrepreneurs, who seek to meet the preferences of  capital 
investors. So-called pro-growth policies—e.g. public subsidies or low corporate 
taxes—often fail to work, and the most economically desperate cities are often the 
first to give away public assets to in an attempt to attract investment.
The law few decades has complicated the relationship between the global 
and local. Spatial scales are the product of  changing technologies, modes of  human 
organization, and political struggle (Harvey 2000), and therefore are contested and 
constantly redefined (Swyngedouw 2004). For people, connection to place is often 
a mix of  intense social and material attachments, which creates an asymmetrical 
relationship between individuals and communities at the local level and mobile 
global capital as private interests on the global scale are able to extract that per-
sonal and social value (Logan and Molotch 2007).
CITY BRANDING
Alternately called “place marketing” or “city branding”, Cities seek to articu-
late a set of  images and associations that set themselves apart (Lang 2011). Quality 
of  urban life has become a commodity, argues Harvey (2008), as “consumerism, 
tourism, cultural and knowledge-based industries have become major aspects of  
the urban political economy.” The narrative of  competitiveness, then, is a form of  
marketing where the city itself  is the product. Consciously producing a perception 
of  the city in order to attract investment, residents, and tourists is not new, but 
only since the 1980s has it become conventional for the public sector to actively use 
these techniques. Often city branding is treated by planners and policy makers as 
simply a matter of  writing catchy slogans and promoting favorable facts, but in fact 
city branding and place marketing means the careful construction and manage-
ment of  an image (Kavaratzis and Ashworth 2005). Place branding builds on how 
people perceive places: through the built environment and planned interventions, 
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how they use spaces, and how places are depicted in various forms of  media 
(Holloway and Hubbard 2001). City brands necessitate the use of  a narrative that is 
not just promoted through media and word of  mouth, but physically constructed 
in the built environment (Kavaratzis and Ashworth 2005). Cities that have faced 
major crises face significant challenges in changing old perceptions of  the city, 
not to mention solving the crises, but if  successful it makes for a more compelling 
narrative (Hermakorpi et al. 2008, Kavaratzis and Ashworth 2005).
Entrepreneurship and innovation are key components of  the narrative of  
competitiveness. Tying urban identity to these traits makes cities more attrac-
tive to global investors, who seek out places with whom they can align their own 
corporate identities (Logan and Molotch 2007). These strategies commonly entail 
“visionary” political leaders (Spirou 2011). Cities, as the drivers of  a significant por-
tion of  their countries’ economies, also drive innovation. Shearmer (2012) ques-
tions the city-driven innovation premise and although finds compelling evidence 
for its support, he distinguishes the “identification, marketing, and promotion of  
innovation” from innovation itself. Especially in developed countries where manu-
facturing and exports can no longer support the economy, international competi-
tiveness must be accomplished through product or process innovation. Banks, 
business periodicals, and think tanks index and rank the levels of  innovation and 
competitiveness of  cities (Forman et al. 2013a, 2013b, Economist Intelligence Unit 
2011, 2012), generating new marketing material for cities that make the list and 
furthering the narrative.
Relatively little difference exists between place branding in the service of  
tourism and place branding in the service of  investment. Post-industrial cities 
commonly turn to tourism as to replace lost industries, and even UN identi-
fies tourism as one tool to reduce poverty and protect against climate change. 
Entrepreneurial cities seek out business tourists because in their view any tourist 
could be a potential investor (Spirou 2011). The costs and benefits generated by 
these activities tend not to be evenly distributed. Today, despite all of  the techno-
logical advancements, only a small minority of  the world’s population can afford 
to travel abroad. 
One irony lost in the frenzy of  city competition is found in the same semi-
nal work by Sassen that helped inspire the narrative of  competitiveness. Despite 
the standardization of  processes, frameworks, accounting, and visual order, glo-
balization has led to increased economic specialization (Sassen 1991). There is far 
less competition between cities than is commonly believed, an illusion perpetuated 
15
by transnational corporations to receive favorable regulatory and tax concessions.
URBAN DESIGN AND COMPETITIVENESS
Urban image making, the active and intentional production of  a public per-
ception, is a key component of  city branding (Hermaakorpi et al. 2008). The pro-
cess by which people build images of  the city, through selecting, organizing, and 
endowing meaning which is then tested through repeated perception, is how the 
urban narrative is formed. The degree to how strong the images are and how easy 
it is for the observer to build the narrative is what Kevin Lynch (1960) calls “image-
ability” and “legibility”, respectively. Although it is a two-way process between the 
observers, who bring their own personal and cultural meanings, and the observed 
city, cities can intervene through providing symbolism and training the observer 
to privilege certain images over others.
Urban design projects, especially public ones, are symbolic and instrumen-
tal in the act of  urban image making. Bourdieu (1986) observes symbolic spatial 
strategies for growth as common in post-industrial economies, where symbolic 
capital, “the (mis)recognition of  honor or prestige” can be exchanged for other 
forms of  capital—chiefly economic. Cities look to a small number of  transnational 
architecture firms for high profile projects, and seek out these firms because 
of  the pressure to design places with the aesthetics of  global capital in order to 
attract it (Lang 2009). More and more cities look to monumental projects as a way 
to both proclaim their globality and eke out a competitive advantage over other 
cities (Smith 2008). World-class sports facilities, beautification, iconic parks, and 
convention centers are among the types of  projects commonly used to project an 
identity of  innovation and entrepreneurship (Spirou 2011). Cities express their 
economic prowess in projects like Kuala Lumpur City Center, Shanghai’s Pudong 
district, and Rio de Janeiro’s Olympic stadiums. Monumental urban projects have 
long been linked to state power and continue to, but today such projects typically 
involve the private sector to varying degrees (Ren 2011). In contrast to major urban 
projects of  the mid-to-late twentieth century that were state-driven, contempo-
rary projects are often initiated by the public sector, sometimes in collaboration 
with private interests, and implemented by private developers (Ben-Joseph 2009).
The city of  Bilbao in Spain provides one of  the clearest and most deliberate 
examples of  a city using a strategy of  architectural production to raise its interna-
tional profile and attract tourism and business. Bilbao had historically been center 
of  trade in northern Spain, and a manufacturing town specializing in iron and 
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steel. The withdrawal of  manufacturing in the late twentieth century left the city 
struggling economically. Drawing inspiration from successful downtown revital-
ization projects in the United States, local and regional governments developed the 
Strategic Plan for Revitalization, which sought to turn Bilbao into the “Capital of  
the Atlantic Axis” through a strategy of  cultural tourism (Sainz 2012). The US$1.5 
billion plan includes six “cultural flagships” designed by internationally famous 
architects, including the most famous project, the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum 
designed by Frank Gehry. The so-called “Guggenheim Effect” is named after this 
strategy of  renowned architectural production and cultural regeneration, and in 
its success in increasing tourism and recovering its initial investment in just over 
ten years has become a model for other cities (Plaza 2006). The architectural attrac-
tions have led to a significant increase in tourism and service sector jobs, but the 
positive effects on overall employment and per capital income are debatable (Plaza 
2006, Sainz 2012).
In addition to the projects themselves, design management is a tool for 
increasing urban competitiveness (Hermaakorpi et al. 2008). As previously men-
tioned, the image of  a city is rooted in the built environment, and maintaining the 
attractiveness of  it is crucial for design management. Hermaakorpi et al. develop a 
framework of  city design management that involves city topography, the general 
impression, the presentation, and the management, all bound together by creativ-
ity. They find that proper design management creates “a basis for the distinction 
principle of  reputation,” and recommend that cities actively involve its own 
citizens in the process to strengthen local identity and subsequently allow for a 
perpetuation of  global perception.
Harvey (2000) is not the first to describe the city as a palimpsest, whose 
surface is constantly rewritten with new meanings. Bourdieu (1986) similarly con-
ceptualizes the social world as accumulated history and thus the accumulation of  
capital and its effects. The symbolic power of  iconic architecture and urban design 
is a particularly strong tool to change not just the image of  the city, but its narra-
tive as well. Through this process of  building identity through iconic architecture, 
cities hope to convert symbolic capital into economic capital (Ren 2011).
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In investigating the complex motivations behind the policy of  architectural 
production in the form of  Medellín’s PUI program, its international projection, 
and the subsequent effects on the city’s narrative of  competitiveness, I have 
undertaken a primarily qualitative approach. Competitiveness is largely about 
perception, image, and narrative than hard figures, although perceptions are 
typically rooted in some real data. Therefore, in addition to existing research on 
the PUI program and the collection of  publicly available social and economic 
indicators, I conducted interviews, analyzed municipal development plans for the 
previous three mayoral administrations, and conducted a media analysis of  both 
the international English-language press and architectural publications.
Interviews were conducted with public officials deeply involved with 
designing and implementing the PUI program, as well as with one interviewee 
involved in the current planning process. Interview questions were developed to be 
somewhat consistent, although tailored to the professional responsibilities of  the 
interviewee. The interviews were conducted remotely through Skype. Although the 
majority of  interviews were conducted in English, portions of  one interview were 
conducted in Spanish through the aid of  a translator.
Each mayoral administration of  Medellín drafts a development plan for 
their four year term. These documents are crucial in shedding light on the motiva-
tions and self-conscious presentation of  each mayor’s political agenda, as well 
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as in providing specific proposals and goals. Beginning with the development 
plan of  the administration that created the PUI program, I have evaluated the 
Development Plans for 2004-2007, 2008-2011, and 2012-2015. Additionally, I 
consider the Territorial Ordinance Plan of  2000, a long-term planning instrument 
unique to Colombia that lays out the framework for the development of  the proj-
ects proposed in the three Development Plans.
Global media reports illustrate whether the city is successfully promoting 
its desired narrative, both in terms of  the quantity of  reporting and the actual 
content. Medellin has been in the global media spotlight for over three decades, 
first as the home of  Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel and the “Murder Capital of  
the World,” and now as a tourist destination and innovator in urban planning and 
design (1989, Alford 2013, Kimmelman 2012). As such, I analyzed media coverage 
of  Medellin’s global position through international English-language newspapers 
included in the LexisNexis database to determine more precisely the changing 
nature of  the city’s narrative. As much of  the coverage and the focus of  this thesis 
is concerned with the transformation of  the built environment, I also conducted an 
analysis of  architectural publications using the Avery Index.
To supplement the qualitative analysis, I collected publicly available social 
and economic indicators from the Sistema de Indicadores Estratégicos de Medellín 
(SIEM) and the Sistema de Indicadores Turistica Medellín–Antioquia (SITUR), like socio-
economic strata1, per capita income, and employment between 2004—the start of  
the program—and the present to not only determine the city-wide changes since 
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The discourse of  urban competitiveness dominates planning today, as 
previously mentioned. In Medellín competitiveness has been an official policy 
goal since at least the 1990s. The current Territorial Ordinance Plan (POT, Plan 
Ordinacion Territorial), adopted in 2000, defines competiveness as its number one 
objective. Five years later, Mayor Sergio Fajardo’s development plan would build 
on the POT, albeit rearranging priorities and the geography of  intervention.  
Medellín has a particular history of  capitalist production and business and gov-
ernment innovation that predates the city’s crisis of  the 1980s and 1990s. 
HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT
Medellín has a long history, founded in the seventeenth century, but 
remained small until the industrial boom of  the twentieth century. The city 
became the second largest in the country, and a regional and national center of  
textile manufacturing, energy production, and exporter of  coffee and other food 
products. From a population of  168,000 in the 1930s to 2.3 million in 2010, the city 
grew first as rural Colombians came searching for manufacturing jobs and later to 
flee widespread violence in the countryside (Pérez-Ayala 2011, p. 18).
The city today is the capital of  the department of  Antioquia. It makes up 
67 percent of  the population of  its metropolitan area, known as Área Metropolitana 




Medellín contains 16 comunas (districts) comprised of  smaller barrios (neighbor-
hoods)2, plus five corregimientos (townships) that exist beyond either side of  the 
Medellín River’s valley. The valley itself  only a few kilometers wide for most of  the 
length of  the 14 kilometer-long city, and as a result of  the fast growing popula-
tion, informal settlements of  proliferated up the edge of  the valley in the last few 
decades and continue to today. Medellín has a long history of  urban planning. The 
Society for Public Improvements (Sociedad de Mejores Públicas) was founded in 1899, 
thirty years before New York’s Regional Plan Association (Hylton 2007, p.74).
Informal settlements on the peripheries of  city have proliferated since the 
mid-twentieth century, as the city failed to provide adequate infrastructure and 
housing to poorer migrants in search of  jobs and forced from rural communities 
by violence. Pirate developers, usually associated with one of  the illegal armed 
groups, appropriated land on the edge of  the city and sold plots to newcomers with 
few legal options. By the 1990s, around half  of  the population of  Medellín lived 
in informal settlements (Echeverri and Orsini 2010). The barrios2 that developed 
often sit precariously at risk of  landslides, flooding, or are located too close to 
streams, causing pollution and sewage to run downstream into the Medellín River. 
Electricity is not uncommon in informal settlements, since it can be delivered at a 
relatively low price and the utility is eager to gain new customers. Other city ser-
vices, such as water, sewage, solid waste disposal, and transportation are harder to 
deliver. The steep terrain and convoluted road networks made many of  Medellín’s 
informal settlements caused serious mobility issues. 
The city and region have a long history of  conservative politics, entrepre-
neurship, industrial paternalism, and Catholicism. Wealthy Antioquian landown-
ers founded the textile and food and coffee manufacturing companies that would 
become the nation’s largest. By the mid-twentieth century Medellín gained a 
reputation not only as the industrial capital of  Colombia and “capitalist paradise” 
according to Life magazine in 1947 (Hylton 2007, p. 75), but as a model of  efficient 
and honest government. Despite the economic divide between the elite and work-
ers, Medellín was a thriving city with quality public spaces and amenities. 
The same cultural heritage of  entrepreneurialism that had made Medellín 
prosper in the first half  of  the twentieth century helped create the major crisis in 
the second half  (Escobar 2014). During the second half  of  the twentieth century, 
violence escalated across Colombian cities and the countryside. By the 1980s, three 
illegal armed groups were wreaking havoc across the country: leftist guerillas, 
ultra-right wing paramilitary groups, and organized crime in the form of  drug 
2Barrios is both 
the regional 
term for “slum” 
or informal 
settlement 
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cartels. In Medellín, Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel proved especially destructive.  
Without the rule of  law, uninhibited capitalism turned to narcotics trafficking, 
with disastrous results. At its peak in 1991, the murder rate for Medellín reached 
nearly 400 per 100,000, earning it the dubious title of  “murder capital of  the 
world” in headlines around the world (figure 1).
After the death of  Escobar at the hands of  police in 1993, the terror of  the 
Medellín Cartel began to decline, as did the murder rate. Guerilla and paramilitary 
groups continued to fight over urban territory, especially in the city’s informal set-
tlements. A national program launched in 2002 allowed many low ranking urban 
militants to turn in their arms in exchange for amnesty, and the following year 
Mayor Luiz Perez proposed a similar program at the municipal level in Medellín. 
Although violence continued to decline, as of  2010 the homicide rate remained at 
the relatively high rate of  55 per 100,000 inhabitants (Merchán-Bonilla 2011, p. 
60). The vacuum caused by the erosion of  the Bloque’s hold on Medellín’s poorer 
neighborhoods has led to an increase in small, more conventional neighborhood 
gangs. 
Despite the relative decrease in violence throughout the 1990s, large 
parts of  the city remained in the grip of  paramilitary groups like the AUC. After 
decades of  violence, patterns of  economic segregation had become amplified, as 
Medellinenses were not willing or even free to move about town (Pérez-Ayala 2011). 
The wealthy comunas to the south of  the city (Guayabal and El Poblado) became 
insular to in an attempt to shut out the violence further north, while in many 
of  the comunas lines of  paramilitary control prevented freedom of  movement. 
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massive challenges, in 2003 the city elected Sergio Fajardo to the office of  mayor, 
a mathematician who pulled together a so-called Civic Engagement coalition from 
the business, academic and social sectors. Fajardo’s mandate rested on his prom-
ise to transform the city physically, socially, and institutionally, a commitment 
embodied by the Projectos Urbanos Integrales. 
In the years before Fajardo’s election, both the federal government of  
Colombia and the city of  Medellín implemented several programs to address 
violence and poverty with mixed results. At the national level, the Presidency 
launched Consejeria para el Área Metropolitana de Medellín (Counseling for 
the Metropolitan Area of  Medellín) in 1990, compelled by the alarming level of  
violence even for Colombia at the time. Out of  the Consejeria came the Programa 
Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios Subnomales en Medellín (Integrated Slum 
Upgrading Program of  Medellín, or PRIMED). PRIMED was an ambitious program 
with partial funding from the German Ministry of  Economic Cooperation based 
on the premise that physical upgrading and regularization of  informal settlements 
could liberate residents to improve their economic situation, reducing poverty 
and subsequently, violence. Two phases were planned, Phase I (1993-1997) meant 
to address the most vulnerable barrios, yet those with a minimal amount of  past 
intervention, and Phase II (1998-2003), which would focus on upgrading the next 
level of  vulnerable barrios. 
PRIMED outlined six objectives for the interventions: establish a formal 
mechanism of  planning and implementation, promote citizen participation, barrio 
upgrading, home improvement and relocation of  those displaced, legalization of  
tenure, and mitigation of  geological risks. Three zones were initially determined 
for the pilot program. PRIMED tried to break with the political patronage system 
of  project management that had become prevalent, and sought coordinate work 
done by several different public and semi-public agencies and NGOs, such as EPM 
(Medellín’s utility company), SENA (national job training program), and the United 
Nations Development Program. The program recognized the importance of  com-
munity engagement with the neighborhoods receiving the interventions, as past 
interventions were often neglected and abandoned by the communities who did 
not feel they had ownership over them. 
Overall, PRIMED accomplished many positive outcomes, but ultimately 
fell short of  many of  their goals. It succeeded in establishing a somewhat flexible 
structure and fostered inter-agency cooperation. PRIMED increased the amount 
of  pedestrian infrastructure by 50 percent in its intervention zones, brought paved 
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road coverage to almost the same level as the formal city, built two health centers 
and 5,500 sq. m. of  recreational space, and provided 95 percent of  households 
in the project zones with access to running water. Additionally, 3,500 dwellings 
were improved, but slightly less than half  of  the 5,180 targeted for legalization 
were granted legal tenure. PRIMED fell short in its citizen engagement, with the 
process “[assuming] a rather passive/client form” (Betancur 2005, p. 340), and the 
program did not sufficiently keep track of  the number of  households displaced. 
Unfortunately, Phase I had to be extended to 2000, and Phase II was aborted after 
an initial planning stage. Although PRIMED fell short of  its objectives, it laid the 
groundwork and provided a number of  good examples of  organization and admin-
istration for the PUI to emulate.
TERRITORIAL ORDINANCE PLAN, 2000
The Territorial Ordinance Plan (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial, POT), 
adopted in 2000, is a planning instrument unique to Colombia. It lays out a fifteen-
year plan for the city, identifies strategic areas for intervention, and sets broad 
goals for the long-term direction of  the city. Whereas development plans reflect 
single four-year mayoral terms, the POT provides a longer-term and territorial 
framework for development plans to fit into. While the plan defines some specific 
projects, it only lays out a legal framework for them. So-called Partial Plans (PP) 
are then devised to actually plan and implement the projects outlined in the POT. 
The POT is an instrument made available by Planning Law 388, passed in 1997, and 
consequently the 2000 POT is the first to be adopted in Medellín.
The 2000 POT covers many areas in its attempt to articulate a “vision for 
the region,” including environmental, transportation, public space, and housing 
concerns, however it is competitiveness is the theme and number one objective. 
Specifically, the POT’s vision of  the city is as a “competitive, environmentally 
sustainable, socially equitable, friendly and spatially integrated, and anchored 
by a system of  structural axes and centralities” (Alcadía de Medellín 2000, p. 4). 
The Plan is an instrument to strengthen Medellín’s competitiveness, and it hopes 
to accomplish this by providing “space that allows for a rewarding coexistence of  
friends and strangers, to provide sufficient conditions… to undertake modern and 
efficient economic and social activities” (Alcadía de Medellín p. 1). This would then 
provide a “competitiveness platform” for the city to attract the investment and 
human capital it wants. In other words, according to the plan, the myriad public 
benefits sought by the plan are in service, though not exclusively, for making 
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Medellín and its region more competitive. It should also be noted that nowhere in 
the POT does it define what is meant by “competitive.”
Centralities are a major focus of  the 2000 POT. Where many development 
plans emphasize integration and all-inclusiveness, the 2000 POT defines numer-
ous centralized hierarchies of  networks and spaces. As such, the Plan defines a 
number of  strategic urban projects, but nearly all are located in the central part 
of  city and are most focused on competitiveness and recreation. The Plan outlines 
the revitalization of  the Botanical Gardens, the construction of  a Science Museum 
(built in 2007 as the Parque Explora), and the development of  an area ripe for 
entrepreneurship and commercial activity between the Convention Center and a 
new headquarters for the city public utility company, EPM.
For the POT, planning in informal settlements focuses on provision of  utili-
ties, risk mitigation and security of  tenure, as with the PRIMED program. In fact, 
it lays the groundwork for the PRIMED phase II program that never came to frui-
tion. The informal barrios are areas in need of  treatments including Consolidation 
and “Integral Improvement,” but are not imagined as places for strategic urban 
projects. In diagnosing areas for consolidation, the POT prioritizes informal settle-
ments into three levels:
• Level 1, Management and Maintenance. This includes areas that receive 
many public utilities, but will require reconfiguration and management 
while the area is consolidated.
• Level 2, Qualification and Contribution. This includes areas that have 
an insufficient level of  city services. The service gap will need to be 
filled in developing new consolidated housing and in planning future 
development.
• Level 3. Generation. This includes the areas most deprived of  public 
services, typically due to economic vulnerability or areas that are popu-
lated too densely.
Within Medellín’s informal settlements, the POT also defines the treatment 
it calls Integral Improvement. Reserved for areas with some of  the worst condi-
tions such as a concentration of  poverty, minimal housing sizes and overcrowding, 
poor sanitary conditions, physically and structurally inadequate buildings, and a 
lack of  educational or health facilities, its purpose is to jump start neighborhood 
improvement by providing many physical, social, and institutional amenities at 
once. These programs include public space, roads, transportation, social facilities, 
housing improvement, and comprehensive legalization of  land and buildings. The 
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Plan emphasizes legalization of  tenure for the sake of  tamping down on the spread 
of  illegal development and conflict between public and private land. 
The 2000 Territorial Ordination Plan provides yet more precedents for the 
PUI program, but it lacked the vision to see the city’s poorest neighborhoods as 
places where strategic intervention could both improve quality of  life and turn 
around the narrative of  the city. In this way, it also lacked the vision of  combining 
strategic urban projects to boost competitiveness with barrio upgrading. These 
ideas would be linked in Mayor Sergio Fajardo’s Development Plan for 2004-2007 
and its articulation of  Social Urbanism.
DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2004-2007
In terms of  content, the Development Plan for 2004-2007 offered by Sergio 
Fajardo shares much in common with the sentiments of  the POT. Crucially, how-
ever, Fajardo reorganized priorities. The 2004 Development Plan is organized into 
five lines of  strategy:
1. Medellín, Governable and Participatory
2. Medellín, Social and Inclusive
3. Medellín, A Meeting Place for Citizens
4. Medellín, Productive, Competitive and United
5. Medellín, Integrated with the Region and the World
As is indicated by the order of  priorities listed above, the most pressing 
challenges the plan hopes to tackle is the systematic crisis of  governability, high 
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levels of  poverty, growing inequality, obsolete social and economic infrastructure, 
and a lack of  integration with the region and world. It emphasizes that “the core 
concern should be the welfare of  human beings and citizens, and not just economic 
growth” (Alcadía de Medellín 2004, p. 8). The plan positions itself  as a negotiator 
between the incentivization of  economic growth and development and the genera-
tion of  wealth with ensuring an equitable distribution of  benefits. When these two 
forces are controlled, development is sustainable.
Unlike the POT, the 2004 Development Plan prioritizes first, the processes 
by which the city intends to implement its projects. The first line of  strategy is 
not only about government overhaul, but also about ensuring that citizens are 
willing to obey the rule of  law and engage with local institutions to reach common 
goals. Second, it defines who the projects will benefit and what does the city owe 
its citizens, including a minimum standard of  health and education, and therefore 
opportunity. This also includes robust public spaces and the mobility necessary 
to move throughout the city. Third, it identifies opportunities to increase pro-
ductivity and tap into global flows of  capital. As with the first line of  strategy, the 
fourth also emphasizes a change in attitude, not only a restoration of  the “spirit of  
entrepreneurship” but one qualified with an understanding that for prosperity to 
be sustainable, it must be shared among all citizens. The fifth and final line is the 
outward looking counterpart to the fourth line.
The third strategic line, “A Meeting Place for All Citizens,” is key to under-
standing the underlying motivations and intent regarding the PUI. Emphasizing 
that public space is more than just its physical characteristic. The plan links public 
space to education by including the creation of  libraries and new schools. Building 
on the framework provided by the POT, this line intersects with the other four, as 
“The territory and its dimensions are the habitat in which people live their lives, 
realize their hopes and initiate their businesses, in order to integrate into global 
flows” (Alcadía de Medellín 2004, p. 97). 
The 2004 Development Plan laid the groundwork for several important 
strategic projects aside from the PUI. Three of  them, the Parque Explora, an 
interactive children’s science museum, the renovation of  the Botanical Gardens, 
and the Parque de los Deseos, a plaza featuring a planetarium, water features for 
children, a food court, and special events programming, are all adjacent to each 




The Integral Urban Projects (Proyectos Urbanos Integrales, PUI) were initi-
ated in 2004 at the beginning of  the Fajardo administration. Architect Alejandro 
Echeverri was tapped to head the Economic Development Corportation (Empressa 
de Desarrollo Urbano, or EDU), the decentralized state agency in charge of  devel-
oping many of  Medellín’s urban projects with a focus on urban upgrading, 
revitalization, economic development planning, and public space generation. 
Consistent with the broad goals laid out in the 2004-2007 Development Plan, the 
PUI program hoped to embody the idea of  “social urbanism” and create a city that 
was more participatory, accountable, and accessible to its citizens.  With language 
drawn from the 1996 UN Habitat summit in Istanbul, wherein world leaders 
pledged to eliminate poverty by providing a minimum quality of  life and housing 
for all inhabitants, the 2004-2007 Development Plan focuses almost entirely on 
tackling poverty and inequality. (Osorio 2009, p.63) 
The PUI illustrate the shift in focus from the 1999 POT on legalization of  
tenure and risk management to an emphasis on public space, education, and 
culture. For many larger PUI, iconic architecture is explicitly called for. Fajardo’s 
often reprinted quote, “the most beautiful architecture for the poorest neighbor-
hoods,” became a slogan during his administration and in the international media 
attention that has followed. For the PUI planners, creating iconic buildings gener-





conceives Medellín as a palimpsest, where new images and narratives must over-
write the old on the same territory. (Escobar 2014) The planners of  the PUI pro-
gram felt the symbolism of  iconic architecture in places previously traumatized. 
Library parks, the most iconic and largest-scale projects of  the PUI, were often 
built on sites of  extreme trauma. The San Javier Library Park was built on a former 
no-man’s land where victims’ bodies were often dumped, and the Leon de Greiff  
Library Park was built on the former site of  a prison. Iconic architecture would 
also send a shock across both the informal settlement communities and the rest of  
the city, to symbolize the city’s seriousness in combatting crime, inequality, and 
marginality and to demonstrate the possibility of  beauty, culture, and education 
overlapping with violence and poverty (Escobar 2014).
PUI was meant to repay the social debt the city owed its citizens, especially 
its most marginalized (Alcadia de Medellín 2004). Instead of  focusing, as previous 
programs had, on risk management and land tenure, PUI sought to generate public 
space and construct public facilities with a deliberate emphasis on education. It was 
the culmination of  the focus of  Fajardo’s vision for Medellín’s transformation, as 
evidenced by two frequently used slogans at the time: “The most beautiful architec-
ture for the poorest neighborhoods,” and, “Medellín, the most educated.” As such, 
PUI remained a major priority throughout Fajardo’s term, with the mayor meet-
ing with all the agencies involved several regularly scheduled times per month 
(Echeverri 2009). Although administered by EDU, the PUI program relies on the 
coordination of  multiple city agencies, including the Department of  City Planning 
(DAP), the Department of  Public Works, the Department of  Finance, the Secretary 
of  Health, and the Secretary of  Education.
PUI have three main components: physical, social, and institutional. 
Physical interventions typically occur in the most troubled parts of  the PUI zone, 
and can include construction or improvement of  public spaces, schools, streets, 
and environmental projects. The social element includes community participation 
through neighborhood organizations and councils. It also includes the improve-
ment of  living conditions and employment opportunities, and the assurance that 
those displaced by PUI interventions will be provided quality housing. In reality, 
some projects contained more community input than others. While many projects 
used ideas and designs developed by the community, in other cases community 
members felt plans were already finalized by the time their input was solicited. 
Lastly, the institutional component is the effort to provide competent planning 
through a deep understanding of  the social and geographical dynamics of  the 
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territory and by learning from previous interventions in Medellín and abroad. 
Conceptually, the program both top-down and bottom-up strategies of  planning.






For example, during the diagnostic phase of  a project, a great deal of  time 
is spent conducing qualitative and quantitative field surveys and familiarization 
with the topographical and geographical context (physical), the organization of  
neighborhood committees to articulate their own greatest needs and wants (social), 
and the coordination of  city agencies, private constractors, and NGOs to agree to 
be involved with the project (institutional) (Calderon 2008). The planning phase 
focused on tasks like prioritizing projects, delegating responsibilities to institu-
tional partners—public, private, or NGO—and the assessment of  each project in 
the context of  the larger neighborhood plan. During the design phase, officials 
called “Talleres de Imaginarios” (Vision Workshops) to allow the community to 
have an active and steering role in the design of  each project, including the name 
(Echeverri 2009). Although the workshops led to community-designed pocket 
parks and smaller projects, in some cases residents felt the plans for some projects 
were predetermined, and that the city was merely placating (Ortiz 2014). Next, in 
the implementation phase, the various institutions then involved in the project 
(e.g. Department of  City Planning and Department of  Public Works) coordinated 
and carried out the construction of  the projects, with the requirement that con-
tractors give a certain portion of  the labor to local residents.
Finally, the animation, or programming, phase of  the project seeks to 
ensure the lasting effectiveness of  each intervention. Depending on the specific 
project, the Community Committees plan cultural events, social programs, mar-
ketplaces tied to entrepreneurship programs, or uses that otherwise imbue mean-
ing to the space. The projects were not only intended to raise the quality of  life of  
residents, but the pride and self-esteem as well (Echeverri 2009). Notably, the final 
phase includes the promotion of  the completed project throughout the city and 
even beyond. 
Key to the feasibility of  the PUI is its financial structure. In the case of  
Medellín, a return to proper administration of  municipal finances under the 
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Fajardo administration made a significant difference in the amount of  money 
available for capital projects. The very first principle in the 2004 Development 
Plan stated, “Public finances are sacred” (Alcadía de Medellín 2004). Tax records 
were checked for accuracy and kept updated, and a public relations campaign was 
launched to encourage the on-time payment of  taxes. Signs were placed on com-
pleted projects with the statement “Your Taxes are Invested Here” to demonstrate 
that taxes were no longer financing corruption (Osorio 2011, p.76-7). The revenue 
generated by EPM is also crucial. As a public utility, EPM is required to transfer 
30 percent of  its financial surplus to the municipality of  Medellín. For 2008, that 
amounted to over US$250 million (EPM [website]).
  Initially two zones were selected for intervention, beginning with the 
Northeast Zone and the Center-West Zone. The Northeast PUI zone covers 158 
hectares of  Comunas 1 and 2, and affects a population of  around 230,000. In 
the mid-2000s, violence in Comunas 1 and 2 in the northeastern part of  the city 
remained stubbornly high despite the city-wide decrease, with a homicide rate 
of  202 per 100,000. The Center-West Zone covers 700 hectares of  Comuna 13, 
another district with high levels of  crime and poverty, and was intended to benefit 
around 140,000 people. The neighborhood of  Moravia in the near-north of  the 
city was already in the midst of  a program of  intervention around the greening of  
a former city dump and skills training for local residents, so it is often grouped in 
with the PUI. Subsequent PUI Zones in the East-Central and Northwest parts of  
the city were defined during the following administration.
PUI NORTHEAST CASE STUDY
The PUI Northeast projects were not only some of  the first to be imple-
mented, but have also undoubtedly received the most media attention globally. For 
this reason I will cover a number of  specific projects in the zone that demonstrate 
the various types of  projects undertaken. The metaphorical crown of  the PUI 
Northeast is the Parque Biblioteca España, a library, auditorium, and community 
space located most of  the way up the valley slope. In less than ten years, it has 
become one of  Medellín’s most iconic buildings. Another project is the creation 
of  a vibrant neighborhood retail district among the Metrocable supports in 
Andalusia neighborhood into a vibrant neighborhood retail district. As previously 
mentioned, PUI’s effectiveness relied on coordination with other city agencies and 
programs. The Metrocable gondola line that connects to the Medellín Metro Line 
A and carries passengers to three stations in Comunas 1 and 2 was one of  the key 
Opposite: Figure 








projects in coordination with the PUI. Additionally The experimental Juan Bobo 
Creek Rehabilitation and Housing project further down the slope was developed 
through the Integral Neighborhood Upgrading Program (Programa Mejoramiento 
Integral de Barrios, or PMIB), a related EDU initiative spun off  from the PUI. Finally, 
I will document two small-scale interventions within the Northeast Zone.
The city chose the Northeast zone for intervention specifically because of  
its high level of  precariousness (Echeverri and Orsini 2010). The Northeast zone of  
intervention includes twelve barrios in Comunas 1 and 2. In addition to having the 
highest population density in the city with over 400 dwellings per hectare (Brand 
and Dávila 2011), the area also had one of  the highest crime rates. The challenging 
geography—the steep valley slope leading down to the river, itself  cut through 
with several steep creek valleys, kept residents isolated and municipal and state 
institutions out. 70 percent of  Comunas 1 and 2 are categorized as strata 1 and 2, 
with 24 percent in strata 3 (Echeverri 2009).
In addition to being selected as one of  the most economically and ecologi-
cally vulnerable parts of  the city, the Northeast Zone was selected in light of  the 
new Metrocable already under construction and that would open in 2004, the first 
year of  the PUI program. The Medellín Metro initiated the first Metrocable lines 
in 2000, and with the help of  Mayor Luis Pérez (2001-2003), the first and the one 
located in the Northeast Zone, Line K, opened in 2004 as PUI was getting started. A 
little over 2km long, Line K has four stations including the link with the Metro. The 
line was built at an estimated cost of  US$24 million over fourteen months (Metro 
de Medellín 2010). 
Figure 5. 
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The Metrocable lines have provided a net benefit for both the city and 
residents who have access to them. The Medellín Metro company, still paying off  
massive debts from the completion of  its two rail lines, hoped that the construc-
tion of  the Metrocables would increase Metro ridership and therefore revenue. 
While it has at least marginally, the Metrocables only meet the daily need for a 
small percentage of  workers in Comunas 1 and 2, mainly formal sector workers in 
sectors like construction and manufacturing whose jobs are located in the indus-
trial southern part of  the city. The physical limitations of  cable cars prevent many 
residents from using the Metrocable. For many informal sector workers, the inabil-
ity to bring large loads into cable cars means they must seek other transportation 
options, while for the elderly, the constant motion of  the cars passing through 
stations means boarding can be difficult. According to a study by Brand and Dávila 
(2011), less than 10 percent of  journeys in barrios with Metrocable stations are by 
Metrocable. The same study finds that so far, the only dramatic economic develop-
ment has occurred in the direct vicinity of  stations. However, they conclude that 
the cable cars’ greatest benefit is their enormous symbolic value. Crucially, the 
existence of  the Metrocable lines provided an excellent advantage for the develop-
ment and success of  the PUI Nororiental. 
The library parks have received the most attention of  any other type of  
project, and of  those, none more so than the Parque Biblioteca España. Designed 
by Bogotá-based architect Giancarlo Mazzanti, the library looms like a majestic 
rock formation over the Northeast part of  the city. The Library Park features the 
three boulder-like structures for the library, auditorium, and community center, 
Figure 6. Espana 
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respectively, all connected through an underground “covered public square” 
topped with a wooden deck that allows for a stunning overlook of  the northern 
half  of  Medellín. The public space of  the library park connects to a corridor of  PUI 
renovated streets that connects it to the nearest Metrocable station. It is intended 
to be “the main reference for the community and a catalyst for knowledge and 
education, as an alternative to guns” (Echeverri and Orsini 2010).
Completed in 2007, the 11,500 square foot complex was built for just US$4 
million. The three multistory buildings are covered in black tile, with small win-
dows cut diagonally in irregular patterns across the façade. The interior features 
balconies that allow light to illuminate every floor. The library structure features 
two-story reading rooms, computer labs, and an event space on the top floor. The 
community center has facilities like a day care center, workshops, classrooms, and 
another event and exhibition space.
The Parque Biblioteca España is popular with local residents, Medellíneros, 
and foreigners alike. However, the project has received criticism as well. Parts of  
the building began almost immediately to show signs of  deterioration. Cracks and 
water stains are evident inside, and some of  the black tiles affixed to the exterior 
have fallen off. According to Mazzanti, the low cost, rapid timetable, and inexperi-
ence of  the construction labor all contributed to its deterioration (Broome 2008). 
An engineering team at the National University in Medellín has identified major 
issues with the facade, and estimates that repairs would cost US$2.5 million in 
addition to the $250,000 already spent on repairs in 2013 (El Combiano 2014). 
The library has also received criticism for its lack of  Colombian influence. 
Mazzanti, however, felt that for the building to be successful, it must “[disconnect] 
the people temporarily from their context,” providing a space free of  the chaos of  
the barrio. For this reason, he felt that “inserting riskier, global architecture in this 
context was necessary to create the symbolic gesture he was after,” (Broome 2008). 
The combination of  risky, global architecture with local “low-skilled” construction 
labor appears to have contributed to the building’s fast wear and tear.
Less visited by tourists are the genuinely small-scale projects like the 
creation of  new public spaces, rehabilitation of  commercial streets, and building 
pedestrian bridges across the steep creek beds, linking neighborhoods previously 
disconnected. The pedestrian bridges, visible from the Metrocable, are some of  
the most striking signs of  intervention. Low cost and generally simple in design, 
they nonetheless make movement across the steep ravines caused by creeks much 
easier. However, the bridges are meant to tackle more than just mobility issues. The 
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Bridge of  Peace over the La Herrera Creek links two barrios whose urban militias 
fought violently over territory for years. In planning the bridge in community 
workshops, members of  both warring communities were forced to work together 
(Guarnizo Álvarez 2007).
Calle 107 (107th Street) cuts through the center of  the barrio of  Andalusia. 
Running steeply uphill under the Metrocable, the street has been renovated into 
pedestrian- and bike-friendly formal commercial corridors. The Andalusia Urban 
Promenade project, completed in 2006, paved the street, widened sidewalks, 
and built in trees and benches, generating a total of  18,000 square meters. The 
US$960,000 project was designed to “seeks to consolidate the commercial corridor, 
giving people a big, comfortable and friendly public space to strengthen commer-
cial potential [of  the street]” (El Mundo 2006). As of  six months after opening, a 
PUI survey indicated a three-fold increase in commercial activity(Ramirez 2006). 
In addition to generating commerce, as the center of  the neighborhood, the cre-
ation of  a great public gathering space was meant to improve quality of  life for the 
entire barrio and become an invitation for outside visitors.
The Park of  the Imagination, a pocket park on the side of  a hill in the Villa 
del Socorro barrio, is an example of  a PUI with significant community engagement. 
On the site of  a neighborhood dump, the community and EDU developed a park 
that would be a gathering place appropriate for everyone from children to those 
with reduced mobility, yet fit on the challenging terrain. The resulting US$40,000 
park, named by the community, is a red and ochre series of  concrete ramps and 
benches that are both easily accessible and fun for children to climb, with small 
interstitial green spaces (El Mundo 2006).
Figure 11. Juan 
Bobo Housing 
Consolidation 
before and after. 
Source: EDU
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Although not part of  the regular PUI program, EDU undertook the 
Juan Bobo Integrated Housing and Creek Rehabilitation Project within the PUI 
Northeast zone simultaneously. Housing was originally included as part of  the 
goals of  the PUI program, but eventually projects related to housing were spun off  
into a program called Programa Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios (PMIB, Integral 
Neighborhood Upgrading Program). Only around 100m from the Andalucia com-
mercial center and the path of  the Metrocable, the Juan Bobo Creek (quebrada) 
runs through Comuna 2, blocking north-south mobility. The area along the stream 
faced high level of  both environmental and social vulnerability. The unauthor-
ized construction of  self-built housing precariously close to the edge of  the creek 
caused a significant pollution, which then flowed downstream to the Medellín 
River. The location of  the housing also put residents at risk of  flooding. Because of  
the hazards, the area around Juan Bobo Creek housed some of  the neighborhood’s 
most socially vulnerable families.
The project was divided into ten steps grouped into three phases. As with 
PUI projects, community workshops and the hiring of  local work crews helped 
ensure Juan Bobo’s social success. The main difference with other PUI is the scale. 
While other PUI each addressed a single issue (e.g. public space deficit, lack of  
mobility), Juan Bobo confronted the issues of  lack of  quality housing, public space, 
city services, and environmental security with one project. The final plan involves 
canalizing the stream to protect it from erosion and pollution. Precarious homes 
were removed from within a certain buffer of  the creek, and relocated into five- to 
eleven-story housing blocks. Green and public spaces were added, along with 
bridges to increase the accessibility of  surrounding barrios. 
Evaluations of  the project have been generally positive. Juan Bobo increased 
both the quantity and quality of  housing for residents, increased legal tenancy 
from 6 percent to 85 percent, and legal access to water, electricity, and sewage to all 
those within the site whereas previously only half  had legal access to water, two-
thirds to electricity, and none had sewage services. Public space per person was 
multiplied by a factor of  six, from just 0.5 square meters per person to more than 
three (Perez Salazar 2011). Although residents impacted by the project had signifi-
cant input, many found adjusting to vertical housing challenging. For example, 
some complained of  other residents throwing garbage out windows. Nevertheless, 
anecdotally, residents of  similar a similar neighborhood in Medellín see the Juan 
Bobo project as a model they would like repeated in their neighborhood.
In the same spirit as PUI projects, the Juan Bobo project sought to 
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coordinate multiple city agencies and involve the community in every pos-
sible phase of  the project. The US$5.5 million project was built between 2004-
07, and involved funding from six agencies, including the Secretary of  Social 
Development, the Área Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá (AMVA, the regional 
planning authority), the Housing Corportation of  Antioquia, federal Minister 
of  the Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development, Secretary of  Public 
Works, Secretary of  Farms, and the Department of  City Planning (DAP), plus 
financial assistance from multiple community organizations. DAP along with the 
Subsecretary of  Cadaster and EPM provided technical and political assistance. The 
Figure 12. 
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challenge of  coordinating so many agencies is both the key to the project’s success 
and the reason it has yet to be repeated.
EVALUATION
The projects recognized the complex socio-spatial contexts of  their inter-
ventions, and it is the same complexity that makes straightforward evaluation 
challenging. Except for basic descriptive statistics, the city has not effectively 
evaluated the effectiveness of  the PUI program as a whole, nor on the neighbor-
hood level. Consensus exists on the general success of  the PUI program in improv-
ing quality of  life in neighborhoods where interventions took place to varying 
degrees, but most quantitative evaluation has been performed only on the most 
apparently successful zone, the PUI Northeast. 
During its initial phase, the PUI program built dozens of  improved streets 
and 189,300 sq. m. of  public space, five library parks, ten new schools and the 
renovation of  132 others. The library parks, particularly the dramatic Parque 
Biblioteca España in the Northeast have received the greatest attention. The library 
parks serve 72 neighborhoods, offering internet access, childcare facilities, reading 
rooms, and community space, while the schools provide 418,000 students with a 
better learning environment (Castro and Echeverri 2011). 
A public health study by a joint team from Columbia University and the 
University of  Antioquia (Cerdá et al. 2011) surveyed 466 residents in 25 barrios 
with PUI interventions and 23 barrios without. Barrios with PUI projects experi-
enced greater declines in violence, trust in municipal institutions, collective effica-
cy, and a higher quantity and quality of  public spaces. Homicide rates in particular 
dropped from 188 per 100,000 population to 30.5 per 100,000 population between 
2003 and 2008 in PUI neighborhoods, a 84 percent decrease compared to a 60 
percent decrease in neighborhoods without PUI interventions. These figures sug-
gest that PUI interventions complemented other policies in place aimed at cutting 
down violence. PUI neighborhoods experienced double the increase in trust in 
the criminal justice system, three times the increase in perceived collective effi-
cacy, and three times the increase in reliance on the police than non-intervention 
neighborhoods. As for neighborhood amenities, interestingly there was virtually 
no difference in perceived increases of  parks, playgrounds, and recreational areas, 
but PUI neighborhoods experienced a huge jump in venues for performing arts and 
educational activities.
While the city cannot provide any direct evidence of  the effects of  the PUI 
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on economic and quality of  life indicators, they can provide The city collects data 
on both human development index (HDI) and Quality of  Life Index (ICV)3 on the 
comuna level (figures 12 and 13). All of  the original 2004-2007 PUI neighborhoods 
show an improvement in both indices, but the impact of  the PUI is not clear. The 
HDI improved similarly for all comunas between 2004-2011, whereas the ICV 
change from 2004-2012 is more varied. Among the lowest five ranked comunas in 
the ICV in 2004, the three that showed improvement were the three that received 
PUI before 2007.
In terms of  citywide performance, most indicators provide evidence of  eco-
nomic improvement. The GDP grew by 70 percent between 2005 and 2010, while 
the city’s Gini coefficient has fallen from 0.54 to 0.50. The poverty rate has fallen 
from 31.6 percent to 17.7 percent in 2012. Of  Medellín’s strategic clusters (contruc-
tion, energy, textiles, health, information and communication technology, and 
tourism), tourism is the fastest growing in terms of  number of  firms, followed by 
construction (SIEM 2014). While the number of  strategic sector firms in comunas 
that featured PUI have grown, the growth has not kept up with wealthier comunas 
like La Canadalaria or El Poblado that already contain business districts. 
3The Quality 
of Life Index 
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The impact of  the PUI has been significant from an institutional point of  
view, although it is just one of  several factors that have led to the transformation 
of  Medellín over the last decade. National and local planning institutions like the 
POT and experimental land management techniques have greatly contributed to 
the city’s success. Nevertheless, the PUI represent an agenda of  equitable develop-
ment, a symbolism that has continued even as actual priorities shift focus. The 
project designs and images of  some PUIs and related equitable development-
focused projects have been appropriated for other purposes. The institutional 
frameworks constructed for implementing the PUI have enabled subsequent 
projects to be built. Inter-agency cooperation and the financial structure of  urban 
projects has remained an important tool for the following mayoral administra-
tions. However, key factors to the PUIs success have fallen out of  practice. Citizen 
participation, despite always being somewhat problematic, has largely deterio-
rated. Projects have also shifted focus from the most marginalized communities 
to a more general, city-wide, and middle-class constituency. In this chapter, I will 
review the development plans for the mayors following Sergio Fajardo, comparing 
them not only to the previous plans, but to their actual realization in the form of  
subsequent strategic urban projects.




Mayor Alonso Salazar, formerly Fajardo’s Secretary of  Government, 
succeeded Fajardo’s term as a member of  the same party, and with a generally 
consistent agenda. In the 2008-2011 Development Plan, this is reflected in the 
continuation not only of  a number of  programs, but of  the general framework and 
the ideology of  Social Urbanism. The “Principles of  Public Management,” which 
defines much of  the ethical framework behind the plan, is the same for both the 
2004 and 2008 plans, as is rhetoric about repaying the social debt. With its title, 
the 2008-2011 Development Plan demonstrates a shift in priorities from the pre-
vious plan: “Medellín is United and Competitive.” Despite the shift, there is still 
continuity—the title is taken from one of  the previous plan’s lines of  strategy, and 
the framework emphasizes solidarity above even development. The 2008 plan has 
six lines of  strategy:
1. Medellin, a United and Equitable City
2. Development and Wellbeing for All
3. Economic Development and Innovation
4. Habitat and Environment for the People
5. City of  Regional and Global Reach
6. Democratic Institutions and Citizen Participation
The Salazar administration continued and expanded the PUI, which the 
development plan includes under its first and fourth lines of  strategy as a pro-
gram of  investment in works of  physical improvement, the social, cultural, and 
economic fabric of  the city, and citizen participation for the purpose of  increased 
social integration, productivity, environmental sustainability, and the genera-
tion of  public space. The plan proposes two new PUI zones, which would become 
the PUI East-Central zone and PUI Northwest, plus a reconfigured PUI zone in 
Comuna 13. However, the plan does not provide much detail under the first stra-
tegic line concerning social equity except for a brief  description of  the existing 
program and setting a goal of  managing and executing two new PUI zones. Other 
programs within the same category under the plan, “Integral Urban Actions” have 
more detailed descriptions and goals (e.g. the positioning of  the city center as a 
center of  culture, security, and solidarity which includes facilities for vulnerable 
populations). Instead, most of  the specific indicators of  future PUI programs fall 
under the fourth strategic line as a tool of  generating public space. Here, although 
described as a social and community investment program, only the physical aspect 
of  the projects is mentioned. The plan calls for the creation of  over 75,000 square 
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meters of  new public space, nearly 17,000 linear meters of  new roads and trails, 
and 136,500 square meters of  environmentally protected space across the three 
zones (Alcadía de Medellín 2008).
Crucially, the 2008 plan sees the ramping up of  global outreach in the form 
of  investment, international cooperation, and projection in the form of  pushing 
for international events and expos. Global outreach, the plan makes clear, is neces-
sary for the twenty-first century city, as cities today must depend on networks far 
beyond the scale of  the metropolitan area to thrive. Left unplanned, the dynamics 
of  globalization foster uneven growth within the city, which is why the plan hopes 
to direct development equitably. However, in discussing the lopsided development 
of  global investment, the plan is vague in how it would redirect resources, saying 
only that as “a center of  attraction concentrating resources” would attract the best 
professionals and create opportunities for those displaced by violence. 
The 2011 Latin American Games and the 2009 meeting of  the Inter-
American Development Bank Board of  Governors are specifically mentioned 
as a strategy for global outreach and increased competitiveness. As part of  the 
Economic Development and Innovation line of  strategy, the plan proposes the 







international tourist destination. As one benchmark, the plan aims for the tourist 
sector to make up 15 percent of  GDP (Alcadia de Medellín 2008 p. 3.16). The plan 
also proposes a more active role in attracting professional talent to boost economic 
development, though it does not specify from where. 
The fifth line, "A City with Regional and Global Reach" is explicitly linked 
to the previous two on economic development and the importance of  public space 
(Alcadia de Medellín 2008, p. 5.2). Under the logic of  the 2008 plan, the three 
work together creating viable interventions that generate higher levels of  human 
development. According to the plan, already in 2008 the city determines itself  “an 
undisputed benchmark for the international community” in programs and proj-
ects that increase the quality of  life in Medellín. However, the obstacles in the way 
of  future international investment include high levels of  inequality and segrega-
tion, poor infrastructure among a handful of  other obstacles like tax incentives.  
The plan admits the progress yet to be made, but proposes using the enthusiasm 
produced by projects like the PUI so far as leverage to promote foreign investment.
Mayor Salazar proposed expanding the PUI program in the two existing 
zones, and adding three more zones: PUI East-Central, a large area that includes 
neighborhoods just outside the CBD to some of  the most isolated and violent 
barrios in the city on the Eastern edge; PUI Northwest, a zone focused mostly on 
environmental projects, and PUI Iguaná, a small, linear area along the route of  
new tunnel link to the west.) In the PUI East-Central, a number of  parks and public 
spaces were built during the Salazar administration, but few in the most socially 
and physically precarious barrios. Although the zone does house one of  the library 
parks—the Leon de Greiff  Library Park in La Lladera—it never developed the 
kind of  flagship projects found in the PUI Northeast or PUI Comuna 13. One of  
the largest PUI East-Central projects is the Bicentennial Park, featuring a colorful 
interactive water feature.
The most internationally recognized PUI project during the Salazar admin-
istration is the Comuna 13 Escalators (figure 14). A series of  six outdoor escalators 
allow local residents to travel between the up and down the 28-story slopes of  
the neighborhood in a fraction of  the time. Paired with public spaces, geological 
stabilization techniques and a cantilevered walkway at the top, the project cost 
US$6.7 million (Schwab and Aponte 2013). When the escalators opened in 2011, 
they received wide international press attention, and have become another iconic 
symbol of  Medellín’s transformation.
In 2009, the city launched Ruta N, a business and innovation center in “The 
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New North,” the area near the Botanical Gardens and Parque Explora. “The trigger 
of  the knowledge economy [in Medellín],” Ruta N is meant to “connect the world 
creation processes in subject matters that contribute to the local and global devel-
opment through the exchange of  experiences and knowledge”(Ruta N [brochure], 
2013).The striking, plant-covered building complex serves as a landing space for 
foreign firms looking to set up offices in Medellín and houses the Global Service 
Center of  Hewlett-Packard. Ruta N is also a non-profit dedicated to attracting 
foreign businesses, especially communications and information technology firms, 
funding scientific and technological innovation, and entrepreneurship training. 
The official brochure places Ruta N into the city’s development plans and its narra-
tive of  transformation and innovation, but only as a tool to generate an increasing-
ly globally competitive Medellín. Although the discourse of  equity and integrating 
marginalized communities is absent, the project does continue the tradition of  
linking architecture and innovation (figure 15) and refers to itself  as “a landmark 
that symbolizes the new north of  the city” (Ruta N [brochure], 2013, p.13).
In 2010, the most recent Metrocable line, Line L, was opened connecting the 
end of  Line K with the rural Parque Arvi 4km outside the city. In contrast to the 
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first two, Line L is meant solely for tourism and recreation. Consequently, it has 
less capacity and a higher ticket price. One quarter of  the US$21 million cost was 
shared by the both the regional and federal governments. The higher fares mean 
the line is not as accessible to the residents of  Comunas 1 and 2.
DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2012-2015
The administration of  Anibal Gaviria of  the Liberal Party marks the return 
to traditional political parties after eight years of  the Compromiso Ciudadana. 
The rhetoric used in both his administration’s development plan and in his cam-
paign reflect the popularity of  the message of  Social Urbanism. Gaviria formed a 
partnership with now governor of  Antioquia Sergio Fajardo to demonstrate the 
continuation of  human development-focused public policy despite the difference 
of  party.6 Gaviria has rebranded Fajardo’s Social Urbanism as “Urbanismo Civico 
Pedagogico” or Civic Pedagogical Urbanism. The name of  the 2012-2015 Plan is 
“Medellín, a Home for Life.” Like his rebranding of  Social Urbanism, Gaviria has 
changed the basic principles stated at the top of  the plan. While still similar in 
rhetoric, the mayor has subtly distanced his agenda from the previous two. The 
plan’s five lines of  strategy are defined as follows: 
1. A City that respects, values, and protects life
2. Equality, the priority of  society and government
3. Competitiveness for economic development with equality
4. Sustainable territory: orderly, equitable, and inclusive.
5. Legal, legitimate, and institutional for life and equality
The plan does include a section on the PUI program, but provides only very 







of  Interventions related to the Greenbelt, 
receive much more specific information 
regarding the details of  the project. In real-
ity, the PUI program was placed on hiatus 
as the city shifted priorities. Although the 
PUI is not currently being built, some of  
Gaviria’s projects are intended to provide 
similar benefits. In the place of  the PUI 
East-Central, the pilot project for a massive 
greenbelt project proposes to share many 
of  the public space generation and environ-
mental protection benefits of  the PUI. 
Although Medellín is historically a 
manufacturing city, the 2012 Plan pushes 
economic development in the direction 
of  information and communication tech-
nologies more than previous plans. In fact, 
the ICT sector was not even listed among 
Medellín’s strategic economic sectors just a 
few years earlier Alcadia de Medellín 2008). 
A number of  programs in the plan are aimed 
at strengthening competitiveness through 
enhancing the information and communi-
cations technologies sector receives—utilizing institutions like Ruta N, creating 
a Science, Technology, and Innovation District, and others with catchy names 
like the Medellín Intelligent City Program. The plan also capitalizes on the city’s 
culture of  entrepreneurship, building on many of  the previous job and entrepre-
neurship training programs and emphasizing the promotion of  strengthening the 
capacity of  small and medium enterprises with high growth potential. In attracting 
foreign companies, the Plan also specifically seeks service sector businesses, recog-
nizing that three quarters of  the 46 foreign companies to open offices in Medellín 
during the previous administration are in the service sector.
The 2012 Plan also lays out the mayor’s intention to capitalize on the posi-
tive narrative of  Medellín in the international media. The plan aims to “Develop 
a marketing plan for the city and region, to establish medium and long-term 
positioning strategies and international expansion of  the city’s public private 
courses of  action within the framework of  competitiveness of  the region, build 
a brand identity and the city from the products, services, culture, and future 
Figure 17. 
Rendering of 
River PArk, 2030. 
Source: EDU
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prospects of  the city” (Alcadia de Medellín 2012, p. 410). By promoting Medellín 
to specific cities, countries, markets, and communities, the city can attract tour-
ism, business, and more positive press to sustain the cycle of  increasing com-
petitiveness. Although the metric the plan uses is unclear, it sets a goal of  1,500 
positive stories accumulated in the international press by 2015, up from 300 in 
2011. Through strategies like this, the plan hopes to double foreign direct invest-
ment to US$1.2 billion and receive 1.5 million national and international visitors 
between 2011 and 2015.
The current administration has also staked its image on several highly 
visible urban projects, including the Metropolitan Greenbelt, the Medellín River 
Park, new community sports and recreational facilities, new Metrocable, BRT, 
and tram lines, and large public-private-partnership “urban renovation” hous-
ing developments in middle-income neighborhoods. While maintaining a focus 
on public space, most of  the projects are on a much larger scale than previous 
administrations’. The pet project of  the Gaviria administration has been the 
development of  a Cinturón Verde Metropolitano, or Metropolitan Greenbelt, 
to surround the city (Figure 16). Described as an “integral human development 
project,” the Greenbelt intends to address a number of  issues including envi-
ronmental degradation, the precariousness and expansion of  informal settle-
ments, and a lack of  recreational spaces around the city (Alcadia de Medellín 
2012, p. 369). Although it promises many benefits to the citizens of  Medellín, 
the sheer scale of  the project, a 72 kilometer-long ribbon of  parks, paths, and 
transportation suggests a broader audience beyond the city. The pilot project 
is under construction in Comuna 8 where the PUI East-Central was never fully 
implemented. Although Comuna 8 residents hope to benefit from the addition 
of  public space and recreation, and risk management, they have major concerns 
about housing, employment, the way risk mitigation is determined, and food 
security. Most importantly, as it is key to addressing the other concerns, is their 
concern about the lack of  community participation in spite of  the rhetoric in the 
official literature and press releases (Barrows et al. 2013, Comuna 8 Planning and 
Local Development Council 2013). 
In keeping with the mayor’s focus on public space and mobility, the 
Medellín River Park is a massive project to restructure the road and highway 
system along the river, create a large new public park, and integrate areas of  
development opportunity adjacent to the site (figure 17). By providing the high-
est quality infrastructure and public space, the River Park is intended to boost 
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connectivity and strengthen the city center, resulting in a more competitive met-
ropolitan region (Alcadía de Medellín 2012, p. 381). 
Some of  Mayor Gaviria’s programs and projects build on the success and 
popularity of  previous ones. Although the PUI have been shelved in Comuna 13, 
EDU has launched a project called The Look of  Life (La Pinta de Vida) in the barrio 
of  La Independencia at the top of  the escalators, assisting community members 
and artists in beautifying homes and neighborhoods with bright colors and murals 
(EDU website, 2014). The barrio’s proximity to the famous escalators means it was 
already one of  the most photographed barrios in the city.
COMPARISON OF THE PLANS (1999, 2004, 2008, 2012)
The reorientation of  the city’s priorities from emerging from a crisis to 
amassing prestige as a tool for economic development has changed the type of  
projects Medellín pursues. Competitiveness as an urban policy goal is certainly 
not new, and all four plans include it as a major priority. However, as the city has 
changed, the appeal and feasibility of  becoming a top Latin American destination 
for investment and tourism has led to shifting priorities in the city’s strategic 
urban projects. In the context of  globalization, economic development and com-
petitiveness is increasingly tied to high level services like ICTs. So much so, that 
there now exists a Deputy Mayor for Economic Development, Internationalization, 
ICT, and Public-Private Partnerships.
All of  the plans draw on Medellín’s cultural history of  entrepreneurialism. 
While entrepreneurialism and capitalism has been part of  the city’s “cultural DNA” 
(Escobar 2014) for over a century, that heritage is now used as leverage for the 
entrepreneurial city in the current epoch of  globalization. Entrepreneurship cen-
ters are one of  the facilities included built throughout the city as part of  the PUI, 
and more recently the city has been building infrastructure explicitly for foreign 
firms, such as the Ruta N complex.
There has been a shift in the territorial focus of  strategic urban projects as 
well. The locations of  projects of  each plan span the width and length of  the city, 
but there is a difference in scale. Generally, the 2004 Plan’s projects are scattered 
throughout the city and its zones of  intervention (e.g. PUI zones) are relatively 
small. Within the zones is an even smaller scale of  projects. The territorial aspect 
of  the 2008 Plan is similarly structured, but with more ambitious, larger zones 
of  intervention. With the 2012 Plan, instead of  a scattered distribution of  smaller 
projects, its territorial focus is on monumental core and periphery projects. 
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Since 2004, the public investment in all of  Medellín’s neighborhoods 
has increased overall, with the share of  investments in low-income neighbor-
hoods remaining at about half  of  the total (Figure 18). As of  the end of  2012, the 
latest year available, localized investment in Medellín’s comunas has declined in 
the first year of  Gaviria’s term, but this is not necessarily a forecast of  things to 
come. Investment also declined in 2008, the first year of  the previous administra-
tion, before increasing rapidly. Additionally, most of  the decrease occurred in 
more middle-income neighborhoods rather than in low-income neighborhoods. 
However, these figures do not describe the type of  projects being undertaken. 
Additionally, the amount of  non-localized social investment has increased faster 
than the total amount of  localized investment. The trajectory of  the current 
administration’s social investment remains to be seen, but as of  2012 the city has 
had an increase of  social investment in general projects over local projects in the 
most socio-economically challenged comunas.
The lack of  evaluation, the declining citizen participation, and the eventual 
shelving of  the PUI program are likely the result of  the political system. With stra-
tegic urban projects tied so closely to each mayor, there is little motive to properly 
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PROJECTING IMAGES AND 
NARRATIVES
The images and narratives Medellín projects around the world have become 
more important as the city’s situation has improved. The negative images of  
Medellín already held by the rest of  the world were used to the city’s advantage. 
The positive and hopeful images produced by projects like the PUI have produced 
a compelling narrative of  rebirth. The city has consciously utilized this narrative 
in the global media to drive economic development, setting up agencies on the 
municipal and metropolitan level dedicated to international investment, outreach, 
and tourism.
MEDIA ANALYSIS
 The competitiveness of  a city lies both in perception and reality. 
Media, both domestic and international, is instrumental in shaping or reshap-
ing the narratives and images projected by the city. In analyzing the narrative 
being projected to an international audience of  potential investors and visitors, I 
conducted a media analysis of  English-language newspaper coverage of  Medellín 
from 2004 to March, 2014. The purpose of  the media analysis to identify what 
projects, policies, events, and locations each piece specifically covers in order to 
understand what kind of  narrative is being received by the (English-language) 
international audience. Additionally, as knowledge transfer and the image of  
innovation is also vital to the perception of  competitiveness, I have undertaken 
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a separate analysis of  coverage in the international architectural press since the 
beginning of  2004.
INTERNATIONAL ENGLISH-LANGUAGE PRESS
Using the LexisNexis database, I collected every article published about 
Medellín in the major English-language newspapers available in the database. 
Articles were limited to only those with a portrayal of  Medellín, and those that 
only mentioned the city in passing were eliminated. Articles were then catego-
rized as positive, neutral, or negative, and coded based on the subject of  the piece 
(Figure 19). In total, 258 articles were analyzed from the period of  2004 to 2013. 
The 2004 start date was chosen as it was beginning of  the PUI project.
In determining the type of  coverage, it became important to distinguish 
between the angle of  the story and the portrayal of  Medellín. For example, a story 
about the impactful work of  a charity focusing on the tens of  thousands of  impov-
erished children in Medellín is a positive story with a negative portrayal of  the 
city. In most cases, however, the angle and the portrayal were aligned. Each article 
was also coded based on its specific content, noting whether the piece concerned 
crime/violence/drugs, tourism, investment opportunities, or international cooper-
ation. The mention of  Medellín’s narrative of  rebirth and urban projects was also 
noted, as was the specific mention of  a PUI, and in that case whether the article 
discussed any dimension of  the program other than the physical or architectural 
dimension. 
Although overall the trend is from negative coverage to positive cover-
age, it is not a gradual transition. There are jumps in the number of  stories about 
Medellín’s great turnaround coinciding with the end of  political administrations, 
likely due to mayors’ efforts to establish their legacies. The last years of  the 2000s 
saw an uptick in violence, which led to an increase in negative coverage and a 
slowdown of  the “Medellín, reborn” narrative. Another interesting pattern that 
emerges is the tendency for articles to be more positive than the portrayal of  the 
city. In other words, coverage of  Medellín has tended to include hopeful stories, 
which helps set up the comeback narrative.
It is no surprise that the first few years of  the period in question featured 
few articles on urban projects, as very few were constructed. Most articles that 
mention Medellín’s comeback also mention the city’s strategic urban projects, 
and in turn, most of  those articles mention one or more PUI projects. Very few 
articles that discuss the PUI mention anything beyond the physical dimension of  
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the program. In fact, the architecture of  the España Library Park alone makes up 
most of  the coverage of  PUIs. It is hard to determine given the size and scope of  
the dataset, but it would seem that over time as the mentions of  PUIs grows, the 
discussion of  the social and institutional dimensions of  the PUI makes up less of  
the coverage (Figure 20).
2011 appears to have been the peak year for positive coverage and coverage 
of  Integral Urban Projects. As the last year of  the Salazar administration and the 
last year of  the 2008 Development Plan that stressed international outreach for 
the first time. It also marked the completion of  the Comuna 13 outdoor escalators, 










This analysis has several shortcomings. Albeit extensive, LexisNexis only 
searches a portion of  all English language newspapers. Additionally, articles of  
various lengths and readerships receive the same treatment in this analysis. Much 
of  the international media attention focused on Medellín has been online in web 
publications and blogs, which cannot be accounted for here.
ARCHITECTURAL PRESS
The projects have become a favorite of  the architectural press. Since the 
start of  the PUI program in 2004, 114 articles have been written about Medellín in 
the international architectural press. Architecture publications are also attracted 
by the city’s compelling narrative as the mainstream press, but in their by-default 
focus on physical projects, it allows for a distilled analysis of  the image of  Medellín 
received by the international community (Figure 21).
Coverage of  private projects in Medellín, has remained virtually unchanged 
over the period, wavering between zero and three stories per year, with an aver-
age of  1.5 stories per year. These stories include a new and modern private resi-
dences, luxury apartment complexes, and new headquarters for companies like 
Bancolombia, Colombia’s largest bank, and EPM.  
In contrast, coverage of  public projects in Medellín in the last ten years has 
Figure 20. 
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skyrocketed, peaking in 2011 with 32 stories. In total, 99 out of  the 114 stories in 
the international architectural press about Medellín since 2004 have been about 
public projects, and out of  those, 44 have been specifically or substantially about 
PUI-related projects. PUI-related stories peaked in 2009 with 18 pieces, two years 
after the completion of  the first PUI zone in the northeast. As the PUI program lost 
steam and became less of  a priority for city hall, so did the number of  pieces show-
casing the projects in architectural publications. The data also shows an increase 
in coverage related to tourist destinations in Medellín, including the Botanical 
Gardens and España Library Park. 
The last few years have seen a decline in coverage of  Medellín in architec-
ture publications, with a number of  possible explanations. PUI projects have come 
to a halt, but the city continues to build several large-scale projects that continue to 
receive praise as “innovative.” A “Medellín fatigue” may have set in, as many publi-
cations have already written multiple articles about projects in the city, editors may 
simply have chosen to cover other cities. The excitement generated by the images 
of  Medellín’s comeback are no longer as novel, even if  the city continues to build 




Press Stories on 
Medellin, 2004-
2013. Data: Avery 
Index.
58
The attention, no matter how well-deserved, has not simply an organic 
phenomenon. The municipality has established agencies specifically tasked with 
the promotion of  Medellín abroad, as both a tourist destination and as a site for 
investment: the Medellín Convention and Visitor’s Bureau (MCB) and the Agency 
for Cooperation and Investment in the Medellín Metropolitan Area (ACI). Both 
agencies were established in 2002, but both received their current mandates 
during the Fajardo administration.
The Agency for Cooperation and Investment in the Medellín Metropolitan 
Area (ACI) is a regional agency that seeks to promote Medellín and its region as 
an attractive place for investment. Among their duties is to seek out and apply for 
international awards, providing the city with more and more superlatives (e.g. 
“The Most Innovative City in the World”). The ACI was also founded in 2002 solely 
to foster international relations. Over the next several years, the agency was tasked 
with coordinating foreign direct investment, and with projecting Medellín’s suc-
cesses and best practices around the world, fostering South-South cooperation. 
The ACI, as a decentralized agency in charge of  internationalization, is particular a 
product of  today’s period of  globalization. 
The 2004 and 2008 Development Plans were the first to include the ACI, 
providing it with a mandate to support many of  the programs defined in the plan 
through projection of  the city’s innovative urban projects. Like the development 
plans, the ACI’s mission to “lead the internationalization of  Medellín and the 
Aburra Valley through actions of  cooperation, business, and investment that 
help increase the Human Development Index and competitiveness in the region” 
(Bañales 2011, p. 183) ties together development of  the city’s poorest communities 
with global competitiveness. To accomplish this, the ACI actively projects an image 
of  Medellín as an urban laboratory. 
Part of  the ACI’s mandate is to seek out and apply for international awards 
for the city to add to its growing collection. Numerous accolades and awards have 
been presented to Medellín and those responsible for carrying out the PUI and 
other projects from NGOs, international foundations, and architecture critics. 
Alejandro Echeverri and Sergio Fajardo were awarded the Curry Stone Design 
Prize in 2009 for “implement[ing] a bold and ambitious public works program 
that transformed what was ‘the world’s deadliest city’ into a vibrant, more live-
able place. Their work has contributed to a drop in crime and the emergence 
of  a nascent tourism industry while it has helped better link Medellín’s disen-
franchised to the city’s cultural and economic fabric,” and specifically citing the 
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symbolic importance of  the projects (Curry Stone Design Prize 2009). The Harvard 
Graduate School of  Design awarded the Veronica Rudge Green Prize in 2013 to the 
Northeastern PUI in particular, in recognition of  the “improv[ement of] the quality 
of  life for approximately 170,000 residents experiencing severe social inequality, 
poverty, and violence” (GSD 2013). Since 2008, the city has won over 35 interna-
tional awards from architectural festivals, prominent NGOs, think tanks, and city 
and national governments around the world (See Appendix).
Perhaps the most prestigious award won by the city is the title of  Most 
Innovative City of  the Year 2013, awarded by the Wall Street Journal, Urban Land 
Institute, and Citibank. Finalists in the competition were selected based on eight 
criteria including environment, culture, investment climate, progress and poten-
tial, places of  power, education and human capital, technology and research, and 
infrastructure, and voted on by readers of  the Wall Street Journal. The profile of  
Medellín that ran in the paper and drew the most votes points specifically to the 
PUI and the España Library Park and Comuna 13 Escalators in particular as key 
innovations. Quoting Fajardo’s characterization of  the PUI as “architecture as 
social program,” the article focuses mainly on the power of  architecture and citizen 
participation. Except for the mention of  the 2011 Comuna 13 Escalators, the entire 
article focuses on the Fajardo administration and its work (Mehaffy 2013). City 
Hall quickly launched a public relations campaign around the award, putting up 
billboards and banners (figure 22) and publicizing the award in local media and 
social media. Although the award only mentions Medellín’s innovations in deliver-
ing beautiful public spaces and community facilities to its poorest communities, in 
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projects and in business.
The success and popularity of  the projects has also drawn attention from 
urban leaders from around the world, including from developed nations. The 
incredibly low cost when compared to other cities’ projects—two of  the largest and 
most lauded projects costing US$11.6 million for one Metrocable and $6 million 
dollars for an architectural landmark, community center, and symbol of  Medellín’s 
rebirth to the world. The ACI is responsible for inviting delegations from abroad 
and coordinating international—especially South-South—cooperation. 
Particularly in the case of  the library parks, PUI projects have become a 
major tourist attraction for Medellín as overall city-wide tourism has increased. 
Hernandez-Garcia writes that “Medellín, perhaps without noticing or anticipating, 
has found a role for informal settlements in branding the city, and promoting the 
tourism to those areas.” (Hernandez-Garcia 2013, p. 44). He argues that Medellín’s 
informal settlements are differentiated and authentic places that contain a high 
level of  symbolic value. The current and previous administrations recognize the 
change in Medellín’s tourism and investment appeal over the past ten years, but 
it is not clear the extent to which such factors were taken into account during the 
planning and implementation of  PUI. One of  the stated goals of  the interventions 
was to change the mindset of  Medellín residents, to make them feel integrated 
into and inspired by their city (Echeverri 2009), but the impact is much broader. 
Medellín is now the most competitive city in Colombia (Pérez-Ayala 2011) and 
the most innovative city in the world (Wall Street Journal 2013). As subjective as 
these titles are, they reflect the changing mindset of  political, business, social, 
and academic actors both within the city and around the world. The perception of  
Medellín has certainly changed over the previous decade since the program began, 
and evidence for a shifting narrative with less focus on civic society and more on 
global urban competitiveness is evidenced by the projects built by subsequent 
administrations.
It is clear that Medellín has experienced rapid economic growth in general 
terms. GDP has grown by 70 percent since 2005 to over US$20 billion (SIEM 2012). 
Foreign direct investment has varied with the recovering global economy, however. 












2012 at $215 million. Although 2013 saw a decline to $185 million, making it only 
the fourth ranked receiver of  FDI in Colombia that year, the city is still on track to 
the goal laid out in the plan of  $600 million of  FDI during the 2012-2015 term (ACI 
Medellín 2012, La Republica 2014). The city has also begun to draw in multinational 
firms like Hewlett-Packard, Kimberly Clark, and the Swiss company Holcim. 
According to the ACI, these outsourcing operations have produced 10,000 jobs and 
generated $600 million per year.
The Medellín Convention and Visitor’s Bureau (MVB) was established by 
City Hall and the Medellín Chamber of  Commerce. The agency’s objective is to 
increase tourism in the Medellín metropolitan region by supporting the improve-
ment of  the city’s image and through joint promotional strategies with the local 
tourism sector (public-private partnerships). Specifically, the MVB has set a goal to 
make Medellín one of  the top five hosts of  international events in Latin America, 
to increase international arrivals by 61 percent and domestic arrivals 21 percent 
over 2010, and host at least 120 international and national events per year in the 
form of  trade shows, conventions, conferences, and sporting events. Responsible 
for fostering both business and leisure tourism, the agency promotes an image of  
a clean, open, and prosperous city in its ad campaigns, featuring downtown plazas 
and skyscrapers, cultural venues and festivals, natural beauty, and the library 
parks and Metrocables. Interestingly, the images of  projects in informal settle-
ments are almost always shot to hide sign of  the surrounding neighborhoods, and 
when they are visible, they are typically in the distant background. The agency’s 
Flickr account contains over 1,700 images, only five of  which contain informal 
settlements.
Air travel to Medellín has more than doubled since 2005, although there are 
still few foreign direct flights to the city and most international passengers arrive 
via Bogotá. The MVB categorizes tourists into three types: backpackers, who typi-
cally spend around US$50 per day, families, who typically spend $200-300 per 
day, and business tourists, who spend between $300-1,000 per day (El Colombiano 
2013). The preference for business tourists is clear. The Bureau boasts a surge in 
events held at the Plaza Mayor, from 560 in 2011 to over 1,400 in 2013. 
WORLD URBAN FORUM
One culmination of  the all the efforts to attract investment and tourism 
through the projection of  urban innovation is the Seventh UN-HABITAT World 
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Urban Forum, which will be held in Medellín April 5-11, 2014 at the Plaza Mayor. 
The Forum, “the World’s Premiere Conference on Cities,” is held every two years 
in a different city and brings together governmental officials of  all levels, NGOs, 
scholars, and United Nations agency officials to discuss the most pressing urban 
problems of  the day (WUF 2014c). 
The theme for the 2014 conference is “Urban Equity in Development,” 
which closely resembles the themes of  the past three Medellín development plans, 
the most recent, “Medellín, A Home for Life” in particular. In fact, the theme was 
inspired by Medellín itself, citing “the programmatic approach to equity imple-
mented by the city of  Medellín for more than 15 years” (WUF 2014c). It is entirely 
aligned with the image Medellín hopes to project of  a city with innovative strate-
gies to share. The conference will focus on what cities can do to alleviate poverty 
and inequality, particularly in slums, and chose Medellín specifically for its nar-
rative of  rebirth. According to General Coordinator of  the WUF7, Ana Moreno, 
Experiences this city and region in the past 40 years are a model to show the rest 
of  the world of  transformation that has occurred in Latin America” (Avané Cataño 
2014). The WUF Concept Paper characterizes Medellín as a city “that endorses that 
the notion ‘Equity in Development’ can be operationalized at an urban level by the 
‘Cities for Life’ concept” (WUF 2014c) and where “Creativity and innovation are 
words behind Medellín’s development and prosperity” (WUF 2014a). The logo for 
the conference features (Figure 25) a hand-drawn wreath of  many of  Medellín’s 
iconic projects against a stylized background of  vegetation and mountains—
including the España and Leon de Greiff  Library Parks, the Metro and Metrocable, 
the Orquideorama at the Botanical Gardens and the EPM headquarters. 
The Forum will feature a Medellín Pavilion to exhibit the many of  the city’s 
innovative projects. The curator of  the pavilion, Francisco Sanin, told El Mundo 
the aim is to “show how architecture, urbanism and the social-economic compo-
nents and Public-Private Partnerships transformed the city, through very specific 
interventions, which have been recognized on the world stage as a new tool for 
urban planning”(Avané Cataño 2014). The pavilion will focus especially on the 
Green Belt and River Park. A special session at the World Urban Forum is planned 
for Medellín with the title, “Medellín: a City for Life.” The session demonstrates 
the city’s role in modeling an exciting model of  planning and development for the 
rest of  the world. The special session will showcase the city’s urban transformation 
of  Medellín “into a city for life on the basis of  equity, inclusion, education, culture 
and citizen cohabitation,” and allow Medellín to lead the international community 
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in “construc[ing]… the elements of  a new 
way of  urban thinking and the tools needed 
to create life and equity in cities…” (WUF 
2014b). The concept note links the city’s 
current pedagogical urbanism ideology with 
its international cooperation.
The World Urban Forum allows the 
Medellín to exhibit its urban projects and 
innovative strategies as a model for the 
world. Tours of  the “Laboratory Medellín” 
are built into the conference programming 
with four specifically designed to showcase 
urban projects (figure 26). By taking note of  
the tour destinations offered to WUF partici-
pants, it is possible to get a snapshot of  the 
images currently being projected.
• The New North tour “covers the 
main public interventions to 
public space and the new gen-
eration of  centres of  citizen and 
community inclusion.” The tour 
will take visitors to the Parque 
Explora, Parque de los Deseos, the 
Above: Figure 24. Front page of WUF website featuring PUI
Figure 25. World Urban Forum 7 logo.
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Ruta-N innovation office center, the Moravia Cultural Center, and the 
España Library Park.
• The Urban Metamorphosis tour “showcases part of  the urban transfor-
mation that has taken place in the city, where renewal, innovation, and 
the relationship with the environment have played important roles,” 
and takes WUF attendees to the under-construction Medellín River 
Park, two downtown cultural museums, the EPM headquarters, and the 
nearby Barefoot Park.
• The Escalators tour takes visitors to the Comuna 13 outdoor escalators, 
in what the WUF website says is “often described as the city’s most 
violent neighbourhood, visitors can see an example of  the efforts to 
increase social inclusion and the quality of  life of  the residents of  the 
Comuna.” The tour also visits the San Javier Library Park not far from the 
escalators.
• The Walk of  Life tour visits the “the first section of  the Garden Belt, a 
construction that strived to close the divide between the urban and rural 
in the Comuna 8, an area much afflicted by the city’s violent past.” (WUF 
2014d)
Planned in part by the Medellín Convention Bureau, these tours, especially 
the first two, demonstrate the effort the city has made to draw links between 
strategic urban projects and innovation. It also demonstrates the importance of  
specific physical projects as landmarks that can be visited. The New North tour 
does include the Moravia Cultural Center, a building that is more interesting for its 
social and cultural programming  than its architecture, but by and large the tours 
focus on the most striking architectural projects, whether PUI projects or more 
recent ones. 
The MCB will also offer WUF attendees six “Medellín Cultural Tours” in 
addition to the four “Medellín Laboratory Tours,” with themes about coffee and 
dance. Figure 24 shows the distribution of  attractions visited by the tours offered 
to WUF visitors With the possible exception of  the Moravia Cultural Center men-
tioned previously, the Laboratory Tours visits to only the most well-known and 
widely recognized projects in the informal settlements. Smaller scale physical 
and social projects and such as the renovation of  Calle 107, the pedestrian bridges, 
pocket parks, upgraded high schools, and job training centers are not on the list of  
destinations. By only focusing on the most iconic structures of  Medellín’s urban 









architecturally and aesthetically striking interventions and marginalizing the 
contribution of  a myriad of  social, institutional, and small-scale physical projects. 
While it may be understandable that tourists visiting the city for leisure may have 
little interest in the intricacies of  the PUI and other interventions, it is important 
to keep in mind that these tours are specifically for participants of  the World 
Urban Forum—planners, urban experts, policy makers, and government officials. 
As the conference tackles the complexities of, among other things, equitable plan-
ning and intervention, participants are given a tour of  the same iconic images and 
oversimplified narrative of  success that has been represented in the media and 
reflected in more recent projects developed by City Hall.
The exercise of  hosting the World Urban Forum allows Medellín to show-
case its images of  equitable and surprising development, project a narrative that 
ties innovation in urban projects to innovation in business, and attract thousands 
of  influential urban experts and officials to the city—not only for the duration of  
the conference, but its continuing influence as a feather in the city’s cap. Even the 
Marca país Colombia, the international tourism and competitiveness agency of  
the federal government, has seized on the promotional opportunities to associate 
national urban policy with global competitiveness. As with other large events the 
city has hosted or competed for (e.g. the 2009 IDB Board of  Governors Meeting, 
the 2011 Latin American Games, and the 2014 Youth Olympics), the World Urban 
Forum not only attracts tourists for the event, but increases urban competitiveness 
by imprinting prestige and legitimacy as a global city. The nature of  the conference 
is especially significant, as it specifically singles out Medellín as an innovator and 




The Medellín Model represents a strategy for even the most desperate 
cities to encourage investment and growth while improving quality of  life for 
all residents. Mayor Sergio Fajardo and his successors have argued that tackling 
inequality and enhancing global competitiveness are not mutually exclusive policy 
goals. The hopeful message has certainly gained popularity over the last ten years, 
and the PUI have been at the center of  both the city’s strategy and its image in 
the eyes of  the international community. Yet the image obscures the difficulty 
of  sustaining such a strategy in light of  global economic pressures. Is Medellín’s 
strategy of  using architectural production to transform marginalized communities 
replicable? If  so, how can it avoid succumbing to the greatly inequitable forces of  
globalization?
BUILDING PROJECTS
Without more comprehensive evaluation, it is difficult to assess what are 
the PUI’s greatest successes or even how successful the program has been overall. 
However, there is enough quantitative and qualitative data to suggest the PUI 
program was at least successful in improving physical and social indicators in the 
Northeast (Cerdá et al. 2011), and the program has been an effective tool in attract-
ing investment and tourism. A number of  factors stand out.
In dealing with issues of  scale, the PUI Northeast was a large-scale program 
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of  small- and medium-scale interventions. This arrangement allows for a number 
of  positive outcomes. As a large, city-wide initiative like the PUI, the program had 
a great deal of  focus from City Hall, and was able to take advantage of  institutional 
economies of  scale in planning and implementation. It also allowed for wide 
public recognition, boosted through public relations campaigns, even among those 
residents far from any projects. As a large program, it was also able to target more 
communities in need of  intervention.
It is also critical that the interventions themselves were on a small scale, 
both the zones of  intervention (relatively) and the individual projects themselves. 
The PUI Northeast had the narrowest geographical focus of  all the zones, allowing 
for a greater consistency of  social and geographical dynamics throughout the zone. 
On the level of  each project, the relatively small scale allows for a greater account-
ing of  the social and physical dynamics that create its context. Small-scale means 
greater flexibility as the program advances—failures minimized and not repeated 
and successes replicated where possible. Most importantly, small-scale projects 
have a better capacity for citizen engagement. Communities do not have only one 
voice, and a smaller project means that individual input has a greater impact, 
which increases the likelihood that the community will have ownership over the 
project. It also means the project is more likely in the service of  the community 
instead of  being dominated by it. Combined, a large-scale program of  small-scale 
interventions allows for concerted effects, in which each project benefits from the 
existence of  the others.
Image and narrative is crucial, and not only through promotion and public 
relations and political campaigns. The Metrocable and the España Library Park 
became icons of  the PUI Northeast, which the city was able to leverage in order 
to maintain support in the community, around the city, and across the world. The 
narrative of  the PUI, (over)writing a new and hopeful history on top of  the old, is 
symbolized in those two projects in particular. 
BUILDING IMAGES
 Utilizing the symbolic capital of  images is both the PUI’s great strength 
and its ultimate weakness. The capacity for iconic PUIs to advance less visible, yet 
equally important projects seems to have kept up political support and provided 
excitement about the program. However, over time the iconic images have come 
to dominate and marginalize the social and institutional goals of  the PUI. The 
program’s replacement with the current mayor’s megaprojects demonstrates the 
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increasing ambition of  the city in creating urban projects that impress foreign 
investors and tourists, but do less to ensure more equitable distribution of  new 
capital. The images of  equitable development do not necessarily help drive it.
The España Library Park has been demonstrated to have benefited the 
community in many ways—simply as a community resource, and as symbol the 
neighborhood takes a great deal of  pride in. Yet despite the hundreds of  thousands 
of  visitors every year, many of  them tourists, the surrounding barrio of  Santo 
Domingo Savio remains one of  the poorest. Yet the Library Park as a symbol of  
Medellín’s resurgence has helped generate millions of  dollars for the city and 
certain economic sectors not found in Santo Domingo Savio.
The political reliance on powerful images is understandable for the positive 
reasons mentioned previously. The mayor must use images to “sell” his vision for 
the city. But when the vision becomes a series of  images for their own sake, the city 
suffers. The megaprojects underway in Medellín are not substance-less, and will 
likely generate many positive outcomes. However, these outcomes will not be equi-
tably distributed and move further away from the image Medellín has projected to 
the world over the last decade. 
BUILDING NARRATIVES
Urban narratives, although based in reality, can be consciously and 
constructed to fit local and global agendas. Constructed from the city’s images, 
Medellín’s urban narrative has been an effective tool to inspire its citizens and 
attract foreign capital. Medellín’s comeback narrative has been shaped by external 
and internal factors. Externally, in the current epoch of  globalization, certain kinds 
of  narratives are valued over others. Specifically, narratives that demonstrate 
the positive effect of  markets for everyone, and those that promote the values of  
innovation and self-reliance in generating capital. Internally, the city has aligned 
its agenda with global advanced capitalism and its competitive pressures. This is 
not to say that the narrative is false, that conditions of  violence have not improved 
or that the PUI or subsequent projects do not benefit local marginalized communi-
ties. However, in emphasizing certain projects and indicators others and in stra-
tegically projecting certain images over others, Medellín has been able to exercise 
control over the narrative.
Medellín has realized the potential of  exploiting the power of  a compelling 
narrative to realize urban projects and generate growth. Cities should recognize 
that in constructing narratives, they have a choice in the matter, and need not 
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simply conform to global, elite-centric pressures. For example, for all its early 
twentieth century successes and late twentieth century disasters, Medellín’s 
cultural legacy of  capitalism and entrepreneurialism has proved a compelling 
point in its projected narrative. Social urbanism promoted this heritage while 
also intervening in it by stressing the importance of  the rule of  law and the social 
contract. The race for global urban competitiveness may be too engrained a policy 
goal to dismantle, but perhaps it is possible to use its mechanisms and dynamics 
to leverage more equitable development. Medellín has succeeded in this to some 
degree, but it has lost the self-awareness and long-term focus.
BUILDING EQUITABLE CITIES
Creating equitable, sustainable development means creating projects that 
balance top-down and bottom-up planning, global and local dynamics, and macro 
and micro scales. These paired dynamics are not binaries, but multidimensional 
spectrums. To do this, understanding these dynamics and how their relative 
strength within existing global frameworks is crucial. Today the pull of  author-
ity (top-down), globality, and the macro are stronger, and even well-balanced 
programs will begin to drift in those directions if  political will is not sustained. If  
planners seek to thwart the unwanted consequences of  globalization—namely, 
increasingly uneven development—Medellín’s innovative approaches to deliver-
ing public goods equitably utilizing the symbolic capital of  architecture provides 
both a model and cautionary tale.
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APPENDIX I
LIST OF INTERNATIONAL AWARDS 
WON BY MEDELLÍN, 2008-2013
Year Award Organization Recipient




Best Work of Architecture Architecture and Urbanism 
Biennial VI, Portugal
Parque Biblioteca España
Excellence Award Concrete Producers Association 
(ASOCRETO)
San Javier Library Park
National Mention for 
Architecture, Architectural Design 
category
Colombian Architecure Biennale Orquideorama, Botanical 
Gardens
National Mention for 
Architecture, Architectural Design 
category
Colombian Architecure Biennale Parque Biblioteca España
National Mention for 
Architecture, Urban Design 
category
Colombian Architecure Biennale San Javier Library Park
National Mention for 
Architecture, Urban Design 
category
Colombian Architecure Biennale Paseo Carabobo commercial 
street
National Architecture Award, Land 
Management category
Colombian Architecure Biennale EDU, for PUI Northeast
First Prize, HOLCIM Awards HOLCIM Foundation EDU, for PUI Comuna 13
Honorable Mention, Urban 
Design category
Quito Panamerican Biennale XVI San Javier Library Park
Urban Design Award Quito Panamerican Biennale XVI PUI Northeast
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Year Award Organization Recipient
Pan-American Award for 
Architectural Design
Quito Panamerican Biennale XVI Parque Biblioteca España
Successful Public Project Administrative Department of 
Public Service
CEDEZOS
Ibero-American Digital Cities 
Award, E-Inclusion category
AHCIET City of Medellín
Dubai International Award UN-HABITAT EDU, for Housing and 
Environmental Consolidation 
project at Juan Bobo Creek
Successful Public Project Administrative Department of 
Public Service
Fair Transparency Medellín 
project
2009 Santiago de Compostela Prize for 
Urban Cooperation
Consortium of the City of 
Santiago de Compostela
Bicentennial Park
Second place, Ibero-American 
Award for Digital Cities
Digital Medellín 
Access to Learning Award Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Library Network Access to 
Knowledge
Best Practices in Policies and 
Programmes
UNESCO, IDB, IDB Youth, 
OECD, OAS, et al.
“Two of the best youth programs 
in Latin America and the 
Caribbean”
2010 Santiago de Compostela Prize for 
Urban Cooperation
Consortium of the City of 
Santiago de Compostela, AECID, 
and the Director-General 
of External Relations of the 
European Union
EDU, for Santo de Villatina Park, 
PUI Comuna 8
Best Digital Initiative, Internet 
Awards
Internet Users Association City of Medellín 
Habitat Honor Award UN-HABITAT Medellín Partnership Programs: 
Healthy Start and Quality of Life 
Survey




American Award for Best Practices 
in Planning and Health
World Health Organization, 
American Health Organization
For programs “bridging the 
social, environmental, and 
physical vulnerability of the city, 
through a strategy of community 
involvement and responsibility 
for risk management”
2011 First place, Ibero-American Award 
for Digital Cities, Large City 
Category
Asociación Iberoamericana 
de Centros de Investigación y 
Empresas de Telecomunicaciones
City of Medellín
Active Cities, Healthy Cities 
Award
Pan-American Health 
Organization, EMBARQ, US 
Centers for Disease Control
Medellín in Motion Program 
(INDER)
Cities for Mobility Award Red City for Mobilities, Medellín’s mobility and transport 
strategies
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Year Award Organization Recipient
Award for Best Local Practices 
with a Focus on Gender
Spanish Agency for International 
Cooperation and Development 
(AECID)
City of Medellín
2012 IBM Smarter Cities Challenge IBM Medellín City Region
Third Prize AGFUND International Prize CEDEZOS business 
development centers
Reina Sofía Universal Accessibility 
Award for Latin American 
Municipalities
Royal Board on Disability, AECID 
and the Construction Activities 
Services Foundation.
“Other Ways to Read” project at 
the Fernando Gómez Martínez 
Library
Conscience Award, Sustainable 
Infrastructure category
José Celestino Mutis Biosphere Mayor of Medellín, EPM
Conscience Award, Environmental 
Corporate Responsibility
José Celestino Mutis Biosphere Ruta-N and the Science, 
Technology and Innovation in
2013 Most Innovative City in the World Wall Street Journal, Urban Land 
Institute, and Citibank
City of Medellín
Veronica Rudge Green Prize Harvard GSD EDU for PUI Northeast
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